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Abstract
The Parthian Empire has long been disregarded in the historiography because of the
relative scarcity of primary sources and the lingering effects of orientalism which hang over the
secondary sources that do exist. This thesis aims to refute the orientalist practices that have thus
far defined the rise and fall of the Parthian Empire and return their political and military agency.
I accomplished this through a study of the Parthian Empire in relation to their control over the
Silk Road and other long-distance trade routes, with particular effort placed towards linking the
periods of success and failure within the Parthian Empire to the status of the long-distance trade
routes and who dominated them at the time.
I found that the periods of Parthian success and dominance in the Near East, particularly
regarding their relations with the Roman Republic and Empire, correlate strongly with their
control over the Silk and Steppe Roads, as well as the rise and fall of the maritime Spice Route.
In conclusion, this shows that the political and military history of the Parthian Empire is better
understood in terms of their political-economic history than some vague orientalist idea that the
Parthians are ‘destined’ to collapse simply because they are not ‘western’.
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Chapter One: Introduction and Historiography
In the 220s CE the Arsacid Parthian Empire, under siege from within by rebellious Persians,
collapsed, ending a nearly 500-year-old empire that in its heyday had not only resisted and
rebuffed the advances of the Roman Empire, but had also presided over the creation of the Silk
Road trade route, an infrastructural institution that united the far east and far west for a thousand
years and more. The anglophone historiography surrounding Parthia is not extensive, but it forms
the backbone of the myriad problems that exist when discussing this empire.
In 1873, George Rawlinson wrote of the Parthian Empire and their Arsacid kings as a
“degenerate” people who, in their rule had become “effete” in their governance of Western Asia.
Not only complicit in the decline and fall of their own empire, their incompetence had also
allowed the ‘west’ to conquer not only their territory, but that of all the “eastern people” who
Rawlinson argued looked to the Parthians for protection.1 For Rawlinson, the very “tendency of
the Parthians was to degenerate,” their collapse attributable to a simple orientalist understanding
of the ancient world.2 The conclusion for Rawlinson was evident and the answer was simple:

1

George Rawlinson, The Sixth Great Oriental Monarchy; or, The Geography, History, &

Antiquities of Parthia (Harlow: Longman, Greens, and Co., 1873), 330-31, 347, 368-9.
2

Rawlinson, Sixth Great Oriental Monarchy, 428.

Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 2-3.
While this topic will be revisited later in this chapter, orientalism can be briefly defined as the
academic discourse centered around creating a divide between the east (the orient) and the west
(the occident). This discourse then provides the “starting point for elaborate theories, epics,
novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the orient, its people, customs,

Parthia was doomed to fall as the Achaemenid Persians before them and the Sassanian Persians
after them because they were weak and tended towards degeneracy while their western
opponents were strong and capable military actors.
More than half a century later, in 1938, Neilson Debevoise revisited the history of Arsacid
Parthia with his Political History of Parthia. Perhaps more even-spoken than Rawlinson,
Debevoise still gives no quarter to the empire he sees as degenerate. After the introduction, any
time the Parthian collapse is mentioned, the empire is described as “tottering and decrepit,” in
“rapid decay,” and a “senile wreck whose ruler had no more power than tradition or his
individual prowess could command.”3 Suffice to say, the Parthian Empire does not fare well in
Debevoise’s accounting.
Malcolm Colledge built directly on the works of Rawlinson and Debevoise in 1967, with the
last published book dedicated entirely to the history of the Parthian Empire. In The Parthians,
Colledge aimed for a more holistic approach to understanding the Parthian Empire, focusing less
on the political blow-by-blow accounting of events, and more on the social, religious, and
economic facets of the empire. However, even when branching out, the telling of Parthia is grim.
Colledge’s Parthian Empire, “had been sadly undermined by generations of dynastic struggles,”
leading to a loss of political stability which allowed for the Roman Empire to invade and wreak

‘mind’, destiny, and so on” by which the popular understanding of the orient is constructed,
allowing for those occidental powers to subjugate the oriental ones.
3

Neilson Debevoise, A Political History of Parthia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1938), xliii, 254, 262, 269.
2

havoc upon the struggling Parthians.4 Though Colledge did not come right out and say it, his
conclusion is as clear as Debevoise and Rawlinson before: the Parthian Empire was simply not
fit to survive in its old age, enfeebled by its superior Western enemies and doomed to collapse
from within.
Such is the state of the Parthian historiography regarding their decline and eventual collapse.
Parthia, an ‘oriental’ empire, withered under the stress of fighting clearly superior western foes
and fell to civil war, the inevitable fate for such lazy, effete, oriental empires. The political and
military lens through which Rawlinson, Debevoise, and even Colledge saw the Parthians
provides only this conclusion, though this is not necessarily their fault. While parts of this thesis
will condemn these three authors for their orientalist tone, as is necessary given their continued
prominence in the literature, much of the socio-political situation in England of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries encouraged the writing of history that characterized the East in ways
beneficial to a British empire. Added to this that the field of economic history, which this thesis
draws extensively from is only truly born in the twentieth century – past the effective writing
time of any of these authors – and it becomes understandable for their works to read as they do.
However, if one examines the Parthian Empire, and the entire Iranian Plateau, through the
economic lens that I will propose, a different story emerges.
Between the 6th century BCE and the 7th century CE, four empires dominated Western Asia,
spreading their territory over Mesopotamia, Syria, and the Iranian Plateau, while at times also
including parts of Anatolia, Egypt, Central Asia, and the Indus Valley. These were the
Achaemenid Persian Empire, the Greek Seleucid Empire, the Parthian Empire this study is

4

Malcolm Colledge, The Parthians (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967), 170.
3

focused on, and the Sassanid Persian Empire.5 These empires that emerged and ruled this region
were some of the largest territorial empires to ever exist, in their own time and long after as
well.6 With the exception of the short-lived Seleucid Empire — a territorial offshoot of
Alexander the Great’s conquests that only exercised power and authority in the region for a
century at most — peoples emerging from the Persis region and the Central Asian Steppe
dominated the region.
Of these three empires, the Achaemenid Persians were the territorial master, holding at one
point up to five and a half million square kilometers of land under their dominion; stretching at
one point from the Indus Valley to the Danube River in Europe itself. They dominated the
kingdoms of Egypt, Babylonia, and Lydia as well as subjugated numerous city-states up and the
down the coast of Asia Minor. For all this success, and their lifespan of 220 years, the Persians
live on in the popular consciousness as oriental despots, seeking only to enslave and dominate

5

Of this 1,300-year timeline, this thesis will concern itself primarily with the three hundred years

surrounding the expansion, consolidation, and collapse of the Parthian Empire. Despite this
limited focus, the entire thousand plus years of history will be tangentially relevant. Therefore,
included below is a reference list of those empires:
1st Persian Empire: 550 BCE-330 BCE, ruled by the Achaemenid Dynasty
Seleucid Empire: 312 BCE - 63 BCE, ruled by the Seleucid Dynasty
Parthian Empire: 247 BCE - 227 CE, ruled by the Arsacid Dynasty
2nd Persian Empire: 227 CE - 651 CE, ruled by the Sassanian Dynasty.
6

Rein Taagepera, “Size and Duration of Empires: Growth-Decline Curves, 600 B.C. to 600

A.D.,” Social Science History 3 (1979): 115.
4

their neighbors to the west, their most famous moments known only in their antagonistic
relationship with Greece and Macedonia.7
The last rulers of this region before the Muslim invasions were the Sassanian Persians.
Rising in rebellion against the Parthians in the 220s CE, they eventually pushed their territory out
to Asia Minor, Egypt, and the Indus Valley, consolidating in large part the holdings of the
Achaemenid Persians, who they so greatly revered. Their domination of the region lasted for 415
years, ending only with the Muslim conquests of the 7th century CE. The Sassanians benefited
greatly from the Parthian infrastructure they took over — similar to the Seleucid situation with
Achaemenid Persia but still advanced their territorial holdings to great effect, reducing the scope
of the Eastern Roman Empire and eventually pushing them all the way back to Constantinople.8
This success, while certainly impressive, was built upon the infrastructure that their Parthian
predecessors had created and maintained: the roads which connected the vast empire and the

7

Perhaps it is indeed because of the Persian’s success against the prolific Greeks in the

Mediterranean that we know them as the despots they were ofttimes portrayed as. 300, both the
movie and the comic it’s based on are the most obvious examples here, having been introduced
into the anglophone mainstream in the mid-2000s, but they also represent the end point of
orientalism. While the discourse of orientalism is academic in its origins, the most damning
effects of the practice occur as those ideas trickle down to the general populace. Given credence
because of its ‘scholarly’ origin, little critical thought is given to how such orientalist pieces of
culture like 300 and its sequel will affect the views of those who see it.
8

Taagepera, “Size and Duration of Empires,” 123.
5

systems of taxation and trade chief among them.9 Without understanding the connection between
the Parthian Empire and the Sassanian Empire, it becomes too easy to claim that Parthia fell only
to its internal weakness, and Sassanian Persia rose only because of its strength. This mindset
only reinforces the orientalist ideas this thesis argues so strongly against. Furthermore, to argue
any aspect of the early Sassanian period without bringing the Parthians in for reference and
context is to ignore the great similarities we know existed between the two empires.10
It is on the Arsacid Parthians, who expanded from the Central Asian satrapy of Parthia,
dominated the Iranian Plateau, and eventually collapsed at the rise of the Sassanid Persians, that
this study will focus. The semi-nomadic Parni people who took over Parthia, and later adopted
its name, emerged in the 240s BCE and had, by the death of their first ruler Arsaces I, taken
control of the former Seleucid provinces of Parthia and Hyrcania and entered the historical
record.11 Their reign, lasting from their emergence in the mid-third century BCE and continuing
to their usurpation by the Sassanians in 227 CE encompasses 474 years, more than doubling the
reign of the Achaemenid Persians and surpassing the duration of their Sassanian successors.
The Arsacid Parthian Empire, in its reign over the region, destroyed Seleucid power and
established their dominion over Mesopotamia and the western Iranian Plateau. They challenged

9

The Royal Roads date back to the Achaemenid Persian regime, but credit for the organization

of the Empire and its taxation and facilitation of trade belong primarily to the Arsacid Parthians.
10

Chapter Four will delve deeper into these connections and similarities, with special focus

given to those shared elements of Parthia and Sassanian Persia which are blamed in part for the
fall of Parthia, but are ignored in a rising, vibrant, Sassanid Persia.
11

Maria Brosius, The Persians: an Introduction (London: Routledge, 2006), 86.
6

the invasion of the Roman Empire and fought them to a standstill in several wars, forcing
decades long peace agreements upon the expansionist Romans. During these military campaigns,
the Parthians also acted to keep the nomadic peoples on their steppe border contained and
pacified. The Arsacid Parthians presided over the opening of one of the greatest trade routes in
all of history, brokering communication and trade between Han China in the far east and Rome,
both Republican and Imperial, in the far west. They forced their mortal enemy, Rome, to pay
extravagant amounts of money to them for goods transported and shipped from China and India,
while handling attempts to unseat their power by potential coalitions between Rome in the west
and the Indian and Kushan Empires in the east. Though many Roman senators, and later an
emperor, derided Parthia as weak, barbarous, and politically subservient to Rome, the Parthian
Empire, in truth, represented the only imperial threat to Roman dominance in the Near East up to
and including their collapse in the 220s CE.12 The Parthian Empire, the longest lasting Iranian

12

Brosius, The Persians, 97.

Brosius references the statue of Augustus from Prima Porta “showing the emperor wearing
military dress; the central motif on his breastplate is the return of the standards by a Parthian. In
contrast to the erect stature of the recipient, the figure of the Parthian is curved, his hair in
disarray, and his many-folded Parthian clothing untidy.” Brosius then comments that, “For
Rome, Augustus had achieved the impossible: the ‘takeover’ of Parthia without a war. It was the
beginning of a myth created by Augustus which was to cloud the judgement of subsequent
emperors regarding Parthia and shrouded the Parthian Empire and its real political and military
force in mystery. It was a brilliant piece of spin, based on no fact. Roman supremacy had to be
7

empire up to that point in history, challenged on one side by the might of Imperial Rome and on
the other by Kushan, Indian, and even Chinese power projections, was and is one of the most
successful empires in the entire history of the Near and Middle East.
Why then do the histories of Parthia treat the objectively successful empire so differently? In
each of the three works I discussed, even when other ideas are proposed, the majority of text still
deals with and traffics in the inherent implication that the Parthian Empire was doomed to fall
simply because of their orientalist tendencies. Debevoise provides hints at a more nuanced
explanation of Parthia’s collapse, tracing their fall to the steadily increasing powers of the
nobility and their feelings of self-importance. This idea, interesting as it may be, is only ever
mentioned in the introduction to his Political History of Parthia and never touched on again,
leaving little to work with.13 Colledge’s The Parthians provides an interesting clue to the decline
of the Parthians in regards to numismatics, showing that later in the Parthian Empire, “full
decadence [was]… now all too apparent,” in the quality of the coinage being produced; “in metal

demonstrated.” Despite all this, she seems careful to avoid directly stating, as I have, that the
Parthians represented the only imperial threat to Roman domination of the region.
13

Debevoise, Political History of Parthia, xlii-xliii.

In short, Debevoise makes the brief claim that with the steady shifting of power from monarch to
nobility, the Parthian kings lost ever more power over time to a divided nobility. This fractious
nobility, working towards many different end-goals, weakened the stability of the realm and
facilitate destructive infighting between bickering factions. It is an interesting idea, and one that I
will address in Chapter Four with the rise of the Sassanid Persians, but it remains one for
Debevoise that was not worth any additional study.
8

and weight too, earlier numismatic standards were gone.”14 However, for as interesting as these
clues are, Colledge goes no further in analyzing their significance, and they remain only clues
that demonstrate the empire was in decline, and do nothing to elaborate why the empire was in
decline.
The problem that each of these historians is subject to when discussing Arsacid Parthia is, as
mentioned before, that they wrote during a period where orientalism, the academic practice of
shaping the ‘East’ into a framework by which they are more easily dominated by ‘Western’
powers, to a greater or lesser degree was accepted and acceptable. Originally conceived in
relation to America, Britain, and France’s domination of the Middle East and Muslim countries,
the practice has its roots as far back as the first written history. Herodotus’ Histories is devoted,
with some extraordinary tangents, to exploring how the brave Greeks of the West were able to
resist the advances of the perfidious Persians of the East, seeking to pillage and enslave all who
resisted them.15
This pattern of orientalist thought is fundamental in the creation of the broader historical
narrative of the Near and Middle East. Orientalism is not just about how Muslims are effeminate,
weak, and unable to govern themselves; it is about how the entire ‘orient’, for all of history, has
been effeminate, weak, and unable to govern itself. It is for this reason that formulating and
arguing a different explanation for the decline and collapse of Parthia is important. As of now,
the best that any anglophone historian has put forth towards the fall of an empire nearly five

14

Colledge, The Parthians, 76, 170.

15

Herodotus may have been born in Halicarnassus as a Persian subject, but his audience was the

Greek reading populace, and not the Persian elite that he was born with.
9

centuries in the making is that Parthia was militarily strong and efficacious in the defense of its
territory up until the beginning of the second century CE; after this point they became suddenly
unable to defend their territory or exercise their political will as before “because it was in their
nature to degenerate.”16
Even when the discussion focuses on those parts of Parthian history where they reign
triumphant, the tone remains orientalist in nature, perhaps best represented by how the kings of
Parthia are discussed. The strength of Parthia, when historians accept such a notion is possible,
does not come from any particular institution or social idea, like the Roman Senate, Athenian
popular assembly, or even the dual-kingship of the Spartans. Rather, Parthia’s strength derives
only from certain individual kings who imbued the entire empire with their own charismatic rule.
Instead of judging the leadership of Parthia in aggregate, as we do in such broad strokes for
polities like the Roman Republic and the Athenian Democracy, the kings of Parthia are instead
judged like a modern historian may describe the leaders of dictatorships; taking power and ruling
through their charismatic charm, leaving their state to collapse directly after their death due to its
instability. This despite the irrefutable fact that Parthia’s leadership in aggregate guided the
empire through nearly five hundred years of existence. A Spartan king may be strong or weak, a
Roman emperor powerful or pitiful, but no reasonable historian would place the entirety of
praise or blame upon that individual for the fate of the entire state. The reasonable historian

16

Rawlinson, Sixth Great Oriental Monarchy, 428.

I can only speak towards the existence of evidence within the English historiography given my
linguistic limits. Francophone and Arabic scholarship on Parthia exist, but I cannot access or
read it.
10

recognizes that the structures behind the figurehead are far more important in describing the rise,
decline, and fall of states and empires, than the actions of any one individual who may hold
power at any point.17
Yet, for all that the ‘Great Man’ theory of history has fallen in popularity among historians of
Greece, Rome, and the Mediterranean, the same consideration has not been given to the empires
of the Iranian plateau. While the Roman Empire is lauded for the strength of its republican
institutions, its military formations, and its systems of taxation, the Parthian Empire is derided
for its weak leadership; the lackluster accounting of any particular Arsacid king to blame for any
diplomatic failure or loss of territory. This is the case, of course, when the Parthians are allowed
any measure of agency in their affairs at all.
The deprivation of agency is one of the most effective tools to marginalize a target group.
When historians view the Parthian Empire, it is often not as an active entity complete with
unique social and political customs, but as a secondary entity to the Roman state with its only
importance in contextualizing Roman achievements and failures. With this mindset, it is easy to
accept and perpetuate the claim that the Arsacid Parthians fell from power because they were
steadily weakened through extended conflicts with Roman expansionism. This is because the
narrative that Parthia is included in is one of military conflict with Rome and is fundamentally
subservient to the goals of exploring Roman history. To contextualize this argument, the problem

17

Said another way, the 'Great Man' theory of history is a poor methodology for understanding

any history beyond perhaps the biographical and even that is suspect. The narrow focus of the
'Great Man' theory also encourages easy solutions to complicated social, economic, and political
issues.
11

here is not that Parthia exists in some works as a secondary figure to the actions of Republican
and Imperial Rome, but that Parthia exists in almost all works as a secondary figure to the
actions of Republican and Imperial Rome. When even the best of Parthian histories, dedicated to
only that empire, spend a majority of their time exploring Parthia only in their relation to the
much better documented Rome; when those histories touch only briefly on the broad topic of the
empire’s decline and collapse, and that topic touched on with little to no depth, something is
deeply flawed with the historiography.18

18

Brosius’ The Persians, while being an excellent overview of pre-Islamic Iranian history, does

little more than accrue available facts about the Persians and Parthians of the Iranian Plateau
while providing little analysis regarding the three empires she discusses. However, to be fair, her
work is explicitly an introduction to these empires. More egregiously, in the 472 pages of the
2009 book by Christopher Beckwith, Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia
from the Bronze Age to the Present (2009), Parthia is given only three pages (83-85, and one
mention on 102), barely enough for an extremely truncated political history. For a book
explicitly about empires on the Silk Road, this sidelining of the empire most responsible for the
Silk Road’s facilitation is baffling. Mark Lewis’ Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han (2007)
discusses the Silk Road only twice (115 and 143) and does not mention the Parthian Empire at
all, preferring to provide the name “Persia,” which carries its own problems. It is not imperative
for any specific work to delve deeply into an analysis of the Parthian Empire, but that the only
books that do so are greatly outdated and the subject continues to be largely ignored in all
English works is problematic.
12

Why is the history of Parthia treated as such by modern historians? The answer can only be
partly placed upon the shoulders of Rawlinson, Debevoise, and Colledge. Their orientalist
perspectives are, if nothing else, understandable for the time in which they were written. Edward
Said, who heavily criticized this trend of orientalism in academic history only published his book
in 1978, more than a decade after Colledge’s The Parthians came out. Further, Said’s
Orientalism took several years to inculcate itself into the academic consciousness and even then,
only did so after a great amount of pushback from those scholars of whose work he had targeted.
Simply put, Rawlinson and Debevoise wrote their pieces during a different time, during the final
gasps of colonialism and the rising tide of decolonialism.19 Their works, along with Colledge’s
represent a common point of view, not just in relation to the Near and Middle East, but across
academic historiography.
In fact, when focusing in on Parthia and its fall, it becomes very understandable why so little
emphasis was placed upon the empire’s decline and collapse. There was already an accepted
understanding for why ‘oriental’ empires fell that had been in place for decades, if not centuries.
Orientalism, in the historiography of ‘the East,’ provided the blueprint for the life of the despotic
oriental monarchy; a blueprint which inevitably ended in centralized power fragmenting as the
effete, lazy, natural tendencies gave way to excess, degeneracy, and civil war. Why make an
argument which only agrees with all the common thought of the time? Rawlinson and

19

Edward Said, “Afterword,” in Orientalism (New York City: Vintage Books, 1994), 329-352.

Said discusses this at length in the afterword he wrote for his 1977 book in 1994 where he
grapples with the sometimes-hostile responses to his work and the critics that seek to dismantle
his ideas.
13

Debevoise’s readers knew why Parthia fell; that was obvious. They wanted the political blow by
blow of the empire. Colledge’s readers knew why Parthia collapsed; they wanted to know about
the art and culture of, as Rawlinson titled his work, the Sixth Great Oriental Monarchy.
The difference between Parthian history and other histories is that those other periods of
history, even other Near Eastern history, have continued to attract attention in the anglophone
world.20 Parthian historiography in comparison, at least in the anglophone world, essentially
stopped in 1967 after Colledge’s publication. There have been isolated articles published on
Parthian art or their views on religion; Maria Brosius’ The Persians dedicates a chapter to the
Parthians but remains only an introductory piece.21 Beyond these works and brief mentions in the
histories of neighboring empires, the Parthians have been largely forgotten in the English

20

Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander, trans. Peter T. Daniels (Warsaw: Eisenbrauns, 2002).

Achaemenid Persia has recently been given great attention that has begun to rehabilitate our
understanding of that great empire from our prior orientalist view. Pierre Briant’s From Cyrus to
Alexander, translated into English in 2002 is a masterpiece of Persian history that deals with that
empire on its own terms.
21

Brosius, The Persians, 79-138.

G. A. Koshelenko and V. N. Pilipko, "Parthia" in History of Civilizations of Central Asia Volume
II: The development of sedentary and nomadic civilizations 700 BC to AC 250, ed. Janos
Harmatta (Paris, UNESCO Publishing: 1994), 127-142.
Koshelenko and Pilipko's article on Parthia for UNESCO’s History of Civilizations of Central
Asia suffers from the same issues that Brosius’ chapter does.
14

historiographical tradition, and as a result the orientalist theories of Rawlinson, Debevoise and
Colledge are cemented as the existing definitive works on Parthia.22
This stagnancy in the English academic tradition may also have its roots in the broader idea
of orientalism, spreading even beyond Parthia or Persia and into how the entire field of Near
Eastern history is studied. Because of the focus on creating the divide between ‘East’ and ‘West’,
and of showing how the ‘advanced West’ has developed from the ‘primitive East’, historians
have dedicated their work to examining how “civilization” has moved from East to West, from
the Orient to the Occident.23

22

William H. McNeill, A World History: Fourth Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University

Press:1998), 202.
Chester G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 631.
William H. McNeill’s A World History: Fourth Edition points to powerful Parthian nobility and
continued local rebellion as the cause of the Parthian’s decline while Chester G. Starr
characterized the Parthians as “the most stagnant in the history of the ancient Near East” in his
History of the Ancient World, existing only as a low point in Near Eastern history that the
Sassanians were able to emerge from.
23

Mogens Larsen, “Orientalism and Near Eastern Archaeology,” in Domination and Resistance,

ed. Daniel Miller et al. (London: Routledge, 1995), 230-231.
Marc Van De Mieroop, Cuneiform Texts and the Writing of History (London: Routledge, 1999)
3, 165.
This trend has seen significant pushback that continues to improve the methodologies of Ancient
Near Eastern history, particularly from Larsen and Marc Van De Mieroop. Van De Mieroop
15

This focus, by its very nature, preferences certain Near Eastern histories over others,
depending on how strong the link is between that kingdom or empire, and its causal links on the
development of ‘western civilization’. The civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt are therefore
important as ‘cradles of civilization’, while Achaemenid Persia, Parthia, and Sassanian Persia are
not because the “Torch of Civilization” had already passed from the Orient to the Occident,
leaving those empires of the ‘East’ to stagnate.24 Therefore, the history of Parthia is unimportant
because it does not add to our understanding of how Greece or Rome came to power. The decline
and collapse of the Parthian Empire holds no value and it is therefore ignored.
Within this thesis, I will revisit the history of the Parthian Empire, their rise, consolidation,
decline, and collapse and will provide an alternative methodology for understanding the
Parthians that goes beyond the simplistic orientalism that has haunted the retelling of this period
of history. Through this inquiry, I will repudiate the ideas of Parthian “degeneracy” or weakness
that has so plagued discussions surrounding them. With this in mind, the theory that I propose to
explain the Parthian decline and collapse is one not rooted in assumptions of a people’s inherent

comments that “many books still see the pre-Greek Near East as a proto-historical period, on the
verge of history but not there yet.” (3) Later, he comments that,
This teleology of history, while providing a rationale for much of the scholarship
on Mesopotamia, is highly problematic: it is ethnocentric, privileging histories
that have a presumed connection to the Western tradition; it employs evolutionary
models that are intellectually suspect; and it denies the Middle East its own
antiquity. (165)
Parthia has unfortunately been left behind in these accountings because of historian's general
lack of interest in the area.
24

Larsen, “Orientalism and Near Eastern Archaeology,” 236-7.
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capabilities or vices, but rather in a broad economic understanding of that empire’s life. This
theory, though ignored in every history of Parthia I have come across, should not be surprising in
the least for an empire that sat upon one of the greatest trade routes in history and facilitated the
trade of vast amounts of goods and capital between the Han Chinese Empire and the Roman
Empire. I propose that the reason the Parthian Empire was able to fend off intermittent invasions
by the Romans, nomadic peoples, and the occasional revolt while expanding their territorial
holdings and political reach for the majority of their history is that between 125 BCE and c.100
CE, the Parthians held mastery over the Silk Road and its operation.25 From this mastery, they
were able to extract enormous amounts of wealth from the trade passing through their territory
that could then be used to pacify their subject peoples, pay for the mercenaries so often used by
Iranian civilizations to augment their forces and fight wars, while also building and maintaining
the burgeoning infrastructure project that the system of Royal Roads represents.26 For an empire
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Mark Edward Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 2007), 143.
The moniker of "Silk Road" was created and applied to the trade route in the 19th century by the
German Baron Ferdinand Freiherr von Richthofen. While there may not have been a firm
conception of the entire trade route as a distinct entity before this point, with each merchant only
aware of a few additional nodes east or west on the route, silks and other luxuries still traveled
the entire length the route, enriching the merchants and empires who shepherded the goods.
26

Brosius, The Persians, 122.

Gary K. Young, Rome’s Eastern Trade: International commerce and imperial policy, 31 BC –
AD 305 (London: Routledge, 2001), 197.
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sandwiched between expansionist powers on both their eastern and western borders, they
required all the wealth they could amass; after all, “the sinews of war: money in abundance,” and
money was one thing the Parthians in their prime were overflowing with.27
To paraphrase the statistician Edward Tufte, correlation does not imply causation, but it
certainly is suggestive, and the shift in Parthia’s fortunes, as I will detail, correlates strongly with
their territorial control over the Silk Road and the income that came from controlling it.28 Around

The Royal Roads, a building project of the Achaemenid Persians to facilitate economic and
political control over their empire, became the primary pathways of the Silk Road trade route.
Because of the dearth of sources on Parthia, making many claims about Parthian care of their
infrastructure is fraught with danger. However, installations and constructions that survive from
the Sassanian period do show extensive wealth being put towards infrastructure maintenance.
Given the consistency of Parthian and Sassanian policies and bureaucratic staff, it can be inferred
that these same sorts of building projects existed to keep the Royal Roads functional.
27
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Christo Lute, “Correlation isn’t Causation, but Sure is a Hint,”

http://www.analyticsguild.com/blog/2016/5/23/correlation-isnt-causation-but-sure-is-a-hint.
Lute comments that,
The abuse of this notion [that correlation does not imply causation] occurs when
it is taken to an extreme, when it’s translated from the subtle claim that
“correlation does not describe a causal relationship but a measure of
interdependence of variables” into a proclamation that correlation has nothing to
say about causation. This interpretation is patently false; it fails to appreciate one
of the main reasons why we use correlations: to discern causal relationships
between events.
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100 CE, two major changes occurred that I argue disrupted the Parthian’s control over their
section of the Silk Road. First, the Kushan Empire rose out of northwest India, expanded north to
Central Asia and south to the Arabian Sea, essentially cutting through the primary path of the
Silk Road trade from China to Parthia. Second, having solidified their empire in the first century
CE, Rome expanded their shipbuilding and road infrastructure in Egypt allowing a more fullfledged trade operation to emerge from the Red Sea to India. This facilitated direct trade with
Indian and Kushan traders who were, because of the Kushan expansion, funneling the luxury
goods that Parthia needed to trade, directly to the Roman traders waiting at the Arabian Sea.
This disruption of both the beginning and the end points of the Parthian section of the Silk
Road was deadly to the Parthian Empire and was the true cause of their decline and collapse.
Without the ample income the Parthians collected from the Silk Road, their capability to wage
wars and support political actors outside of their borders was severely hindered. Added to this,
the maintenance of the Royal Roads that facilitated that trade, along with quick and efficacious
military movements would be hindered as less capital was available for this upkeep. Worsening
conditions on the Royal Road only added to the problems the Parthians started to face on each
end of their empire, adding to their decline and later collapse. Shortly after the end of the first
century and beginning of the second century CE, the Parthians go from successfully defending

I argue that the relationship between the control over the luxury goods passing through the Silk
Road and Parthia's general success is not an abuse of this notion, but a proper application of
discerning probable causation from correlations.
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their territory and influencing their neighbors, to losing territory, political authority, and popular
appeal amongst their subject nations.29

Primary Sources
The primary challenge of this thesis – indeed with much of ancient history as a whole – is
struggling with the scarce evidence that exists. The primary sources on Parthia in general are
lackluster, and on matters of their economic activity and the Silk Road trade even more so.
Despite this, the evidence that does exist, from Parthia, Rome, China, and even the Sassanian
Persians, supports the conclusion of this thesis. Available sources on this thesis can first be
divided into textual and non-textual categories.
As for the non-textual sources on this topic, two stand out: the numismatic evidence and
the excavations of Parthian Nisa, Palmyra, and Dura-Europos.30 Parthian coinage provides the
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This can be seen in the general fortunes of the Parthians from the second century CE onward.

The wars between Parthia and Rome occurred deeper within Parthian territory, and the Arsacid
Kings lost their subjugation of Parthia to Roman interests. The loss of appeal can be seen most
dramatically in the province of Fars, where the Sassanian Persians rose up and ended the
Parthian Empire in 224 CE.
30
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Volume 3: The Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian Periods, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1262.
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best method of dating the reigns of Parthian kings when matched with the Greek and Latin
sources from the West. The excavations, especially of Parthian Nisa provide a glimpse into the
lives of the Parthians, where so many of their other cities were entirely subsumed by Sassanian
and Islamic influences.31 Antonio Invernizzi has essentially focused his entire career on the study
of Nisa within the Italian and English historiography.
Within the textual sources available, three broad categories can be drawn: Greek and
Latin sources on the Parthian Empire, Han Chinese writings on the ‘western regions,’ and the

Unlike the Achaemenid and Sassanian Persians, the Parthians do not seem to have created many
royal inscriptions. Only one remains of the king Gotarzes I, though it is less than helpful for this
topic on long-distance trade routes.
31

Antonio Invernizzi, “The Culture of Parthian Nisa between Steppe and Empire” in

Proceedings of the British Academy 133 (2007), 163-177.
Antionio Invernizzi, “Representation of gods in Parthian Nisa,” in Parthica 7 (2005), 71-79.
Antionio Invernizzi, “Parthian Art – Arsacid Art” in Topoi: Orient-Occident 17 (2011), 189-207.
Antionio Invernizzi, “Royal Cult in Arsakid Parthia” in Studia Hellenistica 51 (2011), 649-690.
One of the great problems of working in ancient Iranian history is the specific set of valuable
locations for urban populations to settle. Unlike Mesopotamia, where the shifting rivers might
force a once-populated area to be abandoned (and thus preserved for future archaeologists), the
mountainous regions of the Iranian Plateau mean that the major city locations of the
Achaemenids became the major city locations of the Arsacids, on and on down to the present
day. This complicates excavations and obscures the origins of much of the data that we do have.
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ostraca that detail some aspects of the administrative and economic functions of the empire.32
Unfortunately, textual sources like those written in Greek and Latin are virtually nonexistent
from within the Parthian empire.
Since so little survives from the Parthian period, a cohesive picture must be constructed
using the accounts of neighboring empires, which presents its own set of problems that will be
discussed below. The sources that best paint the picture of Parthian history are those written in
Greek and Latin and can be divided into two sections: those that primarily detail the military
conflicts Rome had with Parthia, and those that attempt to document a historical or geographical
examination of the Parthia Empire. Both are useful for their connection with the established
Roman historiography which provides easily dated moments that are used to reconstruct the
Parthian reign. The downside, to those texts dealing with the Roman-Parthian conflict is that
only the Roman perspective is given, and they are, because of that perspective, hostile to the
Parthian point-of-view.
Cassius Dio’s Roman History is emblematic of this problem. Parthia comes up four times
in Dio’s History, once each for the invasions into Parthia by Crassus, Marc Antony, Trajan, and
Caracalla, with each section having only enough contextual information to detail the failures or
successes of each Roman general.33 Dio even comments about the Parthians that, “now about
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The Western Regions was a common way to describe those territories to the west of China,
beyond where the Han could exercise total political and economic domination.
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Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917-1927), Books 40, 49, 68, 79.
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their race and their country and their peculiar customs many have written, and I have no
intention of describing them,” making clear that any information gleaned about Parthia is only to
better understand the Roman perspective.34
Plutarch’s “Life of Crassus” acts in a similar fashion, constructing a narrative of Crassus
where the Parthians play only a faciliatory role.35 Works such as these, and others like Eutropius’
Abridgement of Roman History and Velleius Paterculus’ Roman History give detailed
explorations into specific moments of the Roman and Parthian empires without exploring the
context of any of these moments. It is from works like these that the histories of Parthia from the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries were written, providing detailed and lurid views of the
debauched actions of this ‘oriental monarchy.’36
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Cassius Dio, Roman History: Volume III, 40.15.1.
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Plutarch, “Life of Crassus” in Lives: Volume III, trans. Bernadotte Perrin, Loeb Classical

Library (Cambridge University Press, 1916).
Plutarch, “Life of Antony” in Lives: Volume IX, trans. Bernadotte Perrin, Loeb Classical Library
(Cambridge University Press, 1920).
Plutarch must be given even greater scrutiny given the intended effect of his Lives being to
compare two figures together, often trying to explain a moral lesson, rather than a strictly
historical one.
36

Plutarch, "Life of Crassus," 31.7, 33.2.

Plutarch’s Parthians at the Battle of Carrhae “cut to pieces” the fleeing Romans and used the
decapitated head of Crassus as a prop in a play they put on, “lifting it up with clapping of hands
and shouts of joy.”
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Luckily, not all Greek and Latin histories were written in such a vein. In particular,
sections 8.48 and 8.51 of Appian’s Syrian Wars provide an early and relatively unbiased account
of the Parthians in their struggles against the Seleucid Empire, while Josephus’ Jewish
Antiquities contains a section on the civil war between Vonones I and Artabanus II, writing like
Appian with little interest other than the depiction of the events.37 Books XLI and XLII of
Justin’s Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus provide an exemplary early history
of the Parthian Empire up to the reign of Phraates and his diplomacy with Augustus, providing
the context that Paterculus, Eutropius, Dio, and Plutarch often lacked.38 The best works,
however, for exploring the broad scope of Parthian history and the systems by which they ran
their empire are the works of Isadore of Charax who put together a travel guide of the Parthian
Stations across the empire, and Pliny the Elder, whose Natural History lays out the broad
political makeup of the eighteen kingdoms of Parthia.39
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Beardsley, 1914), 18 Ch. 2.
38

Justin, Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus, trans. Rev. J.S. Watson,

(London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853).
39

Isadore of Charax, Parthian Stations, trans. Wilfred H. Schoff, (Philadelphia: The Commercial

Museum, 1914).
Pliny the Elder, The Natural History, trans. John Bostock, (London: Taylor and Francis, 1855).
24

Lastly, works such as Strabo’s Geography and the Periplus Maris Erythraei will be
utilized within this thesis, as they provide general geographical guides of the known Parthian
world.40 The Periplus functions exceptionally well as a travel and trade guide for the maritime
Spice Route and provides superb contextual evidence towards the propagation of that trade in the
first and second centuries CE.
Moving the focus to Chinese writings, two vital sources exist: the Records of the Grand
Historian, by Ssu-ma Ch’ien and the Hou Hanshu by Fan Ye. Together, these works detail the
Chinese expeditions which ‘discovered’ the western regions and marked the beginnings of the
Silk Road.41 Both deal with the opening of trade and communication between Han China and the
West in the late second and early first centuries BCE. Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s Records act more as a
biographical narrative of Chang Ch’ien’s journey to the west, while Fan Ye’s Hou Hanshu reads
as closer to Pliny the Elder’s Natural History, preferring a more geographical and less narrative
focus on the history of the western regions. Both works are valuable, but Fan Ye’s Hou Hanshu
must be taken with more cautious analysis than the works of Ssu-ma Ch’ien. While Ss-ma lived
during the events he wrote about, dying in the first century BCE after the beginning of trade
along what would come to be known as the Silk Road, Fan Ye finished the Hou Hanshu in the
fifth century CE, half a millennium after the events he supposedly wrote about. While this work
was almost certainly put together using court records and the information that China had learned
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Periplus Maris Erythraei, trans. Lionel Casson, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
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was not any conception at the time in the second century BCE that this is what was being
accomplished.
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in the interim, those exact things make it important to question the Hou Hanshu to its ability to
faithfully recount the specific events of the late second century BCE.42
The papyri and ostraca of the Roman East provide another pool of evidence to draw from,
though this thesis avoids delving into the micro-economic studies that these pieces allow for. The
best source of this evidence comes from Egypt and the maritime Spice Route, but limited sources
can be found from other sectors of the Roman East.43 While this thesis does not delve deeply into
the study of these pieces, being more a political history informed by economic theory than a
strict economic history, they can be used to evaluate the flow of goods traveling into and out of
the Roman empire. Additionally, at Nisa, several thousand ostraca have been uncovered that
detail some of the history of Eastern Parthia, particularly related to their policy of taxation and
customs, which integrate nicely into the evidence that Isidore of Charax provides in his Parthian
Stations.44
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To complicate the matter, there is scholarly debate over whether the Hou Hanshu simply copied
passages of the Records or, more intriguing, that the Hou Hanshu, in its early forms, provided
the material for the Records to copy. For a rundown of this scholarly debate, the entire second
section of this introduction is worth reading (3-39). In my view, the Hou Hanshu acts as an
ancient secondary source, and is valuable for the information it contains. For this thesis, where I
am examining the general Chinese understanding of Parthia, both works are valuable.
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I mentioned above that the Parthian histories of the last two centuries were primarily
written from a collection of the Latin and Greek sources, which tended to be antagonistic
towards the Parthians.45 It is at this point that Rawlinson, Debevoise, and Colledge must be given
some slack for the works that they produced. Working from these sources to near exclusivity
creates an image of the Parthians that, within the bounds of the nineteenth and twentieth century
colonialism and imperialism, seemed natural and just.46 The fact that English translations of the
Han Chinese records did not emerge until the mid to late twentieth century further excuses some
of these author’s historiographical choices. Finally, all three authors wrote in a time where
economic history in general was in its infancy.47 This does not excuse them for the way they
wrote about Parthia, but it provides an explanation for it beyond an accusation of malice.48
Aside from these primary sources, I want to also make special mention of those historians
of Rome’s trade along both the Silk and Spice Roads as their work is the closest to a discussion
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“Political History of Iran under the Arsacids” within the Cambridge History of Iran comes much
closer to qualifying as he wrote a strictly political history that benefited from such sources.
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tradition, barring a few references to older Achaemenid inscriptions and brief discussions on
Arsacid coinage.
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Near Eastern economic history in particular, even more so.
In many ways, the true criticism around Rawlinson, Debevoise and Colledge’s political

histories of Parthia is in how the modern historiography continues to accept them without
criticism (see: McNeill, A World History, 202 and Starr, A history of the Ancient World, 631).
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on this thesis’ topic as could be found. Raoul McLaughlin and his two works on Roman
economic interactions with the east form a backbone of my fourth chapter. The evidence he
brought together in his Rome and the Distant East and his Roman Empire on the Indian Ocean
was invaluable to this work.49 Additionally, Gary Young’s Rome’s Eastern Trade was similarly
invaluable, though I disagree with some of the conclusions he makes regarding Roman policy
regarding their economic situation.50

Organization of this Paper
This first chapter having provided an introduction and overview to the historiography of
Parthia and aims of this thesis, the following chapters will each be devoted to a chronological
accounting of the Parthians: their emergence, rise to dominance, decline, and collapse. Each of
these four chapters will detail the literary evidence of the political and military histories of the
Parthian Empire, as well as a discussion towards how such information fits within the
economically-informed argument this thesis makes. This separation of Parthian history into four
periods will show that Parthian success and failure is highly correlated to their control over the
Silk Road trade route. This will provide the evidence for my theory that when Parthia is strong
against the military and political actions of their enemies and effective at quieting internal strife,
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their control of the Silk Road was strong. When they began to lose territory to Roman incursion
and began facing troubles from within they cannot deal with, they had already lost significant
control over the trade routes that had made them so strong before.
Additionally, this structure will also highlight the drastic shifts in fortunes that the Parthian
Empire underwent, from success to failure; back to success again and then immediately to
collapse. This, perhaps more than anything else, disproves the theory of a degenerate Parthia,
weakened by their ‘oriental’ nature and doomed to fall. After all, if Parthia was in such a
degenerative state near the end of their reign, their victory over the Romans in 216-7 CE
becomes highly implausible. Finally, my conclusion, along with discussing the further paths of
this research, will also document the birth of the Sassanian Empire and how their emergence fits
within the economic theory this thesis presents.
The second chapter and first period will focus on the emergence of the Parthians and their
rise to dominance, first as a kingdom in the northern Seleucid province of Parthia and Hyrcania,
and later as rulers of the entire Iranian plateau. Dating between the reigns of Arsaces I (247-217
BCE) and Artabanus I (128-124/3 BCE), this period witnessed not only the beginning of
diplomatic relations between Parthia and Rome, but also the beginnings of trade on the Silk Road
as Han China sought military and economic aid against their own enemies. These two
relationships defined the Parthian Empire for much of their history and dominated the narrative
of their Second Period.
The third chapter and second period, beginning with the rise of Mithridates II (124/3 - 88/7
BCE) as king and ending with the death of Vologeses I (51 - 76/80 CE) brings the consolidated
might of the Parthian Empire to bear on an expansionist Roman Republic, raising tensions across
their mutual border along the Euphrates River and multiple times escalating to declared war.
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During this period, Parthia challenged Rome to territories in both Syria and Armenia claiming
several extraordinary victories in the former and establishing political dominance in the latter.
Concurrently, the Silk Road overseen by Parthian interests were fully operational, granting the
Parthian economic, as well as political power in the region. In short, this period saw the
Parthians at their most militarily successful in their conflict with Rome. It is logical to assume
successes on other fronts of the Parthian Empire; however, we hear little to nothing about
Parthian military or political machinations in their eastern provinces, even with the later rise of
the Kushan Empire. It is only the numerous works written by Romans either lamenting their
losses or posturing for better appearances that give historians such a good picture of this period.
While this conflict raged between Parthian and Roman armies, subject merchants of both the
Parthians and Romans engaged in a staggering amount of trade at key cities along their border.51
Trade during this period was almost certainly at the highest it was during the Parthian dominion
of the Iranian Plateau; no coincidence when one correlates their military and political victories of
this same time frame.52
The fourth chapter and third period of Parthian history, from the end of the first century CE
to the beginning of the third century CE begins with the rise of the Kushan Empire in the east
and sees a marked reverse in the power and prestige of the Parthian state. After the mid-late first
century CE, for more than a century, no Parthian army bested a Roman one on the field of battle,
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whether they were within core Parthian territories or without. Parthian political and diplomatic
control of Armenia slipped away, and Roman armies sacked multiple Parthian cities in
Mesopotamia and eventually established dominance over northern Mesopotamia. Continuing the
correlation between Parthia’s economy and their success, this period saw a proliferation of new
Roman trade opportunities which cut out Parthian merchants entirely, strengthening the position
of the new Kushan Empire which exists as a territorial power between Parthian and Chinese
trade.
The fifth chapter and final period of Parthian history is the shortest of the four, lasting at
greatest extent 20 - 30 years, and comprising the last war between Parthia and Rome in 216-7 CE
and the revolution of the Persians under the Sassanians which overthrew the ruling Arsacid
Parthians. I am designating this a separate and distinct period in Parthian history because of its
importance to the narratives surrounding Parthia’s decline and fall. Simply put, the success
Parthia had over the Roman Empire in 217 CE is comparable to their earlier victories over
Crassus and Marc Antony in their second period. Within the narratives of Rawlinson, Debevoise,
and Colledge, this is an improbability of such a scale that it is unacceptable. The degenerate,
weak, oriental Parthian Empire of the classic histories could not have been able to not only best
Rome on the field of battle, outside their core territory in Armenia, but also extract indemnities
totaling millions of sesterces of silver from their enemy.53 In this chapter, I will explore the
Antonine Plague, the reduction in Roman trade opportunities, and the resurrection of the Steppe
Route trade. Within this economic lens, one sees a resurgent Parthian trade system which not
only granted them the capability to wage such a war, but also the motive to do so.
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Though the political and military histories of each of these periods are important tools to
frame my economic argument, it is the focus on the Silk Road that provides the evidence through
a study of its rise and fall in importance through the Parthian reign. Laced throughout each of
chapters two through five will be an examination of the beginnings of the Silk Road along with
its neighboring routes which facilitated trade between Asia, Africa, and Europe. Part and parcel
of this correlation will be the Kushan Empire and the Roman maritime Spice Route trade, which
spell the end of Parthian economic dominance and the cause of their decline and collapse.
The sixth and final chapter will explore the third and fourth centuries CE, and act as a post
mortem for the Parthians while exploring how their successors, the Sassanian Persian Empire,
used the economic might of the Silk Road to ascend back to a place of power in the region. The
Sassanian Empire provides in its history counterpoints to many of the arguments made against
the Parthian Empire, particularly the argument of the fractious nobility tearing the empire down,
and this chapter will explore those ideas and show why they have little to commend them.
By the end of this thesis, I aim to rehabilitate the Parthian Empire by returning to them a sense of
autonomy and agency. By viewing their history through this economic lens, the Parthians cease
to exist solely as an orientalist monarchy, doomed to fail because of their ‘nature’, and become
instead an agent in their own affairs as they always were.
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Chapter Two: Parthian Origins
The origins of Parthia as a military and political power begins with the political fracturing of
the Seleucid Empire in the 240s BCE. In 246 BCE, the nomadic Parni people, led by King
Arsaces I, made several incursions into the Seleucid province of Parthia but were rebuffed by the
royal army.54 Later that year, with the death of the Seleucid king, the Seleucid governors of
Parthia and Bactria rebelled, seeking independence. The new Seleucid king, busy with a war
against Ptolemaic Egypt was unable to respond, leaving the two rebellious governors alone
against the might of a renewed Parni assault. While the royal army had little difficulty repulsing
the invading Parni, the governor of Parthia, Andragoras, had no such capability and the province
fell to the invaders.55
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Prior to their takeover of the province of Parthia, the Parni were mostly unknown. It is clear they
were nomadic and had perhaps been dwelling east and north of the Caspian Sea for several
hundred years. When writing on the Battle of Gaugamela in the final months of the Achaemenid
Persian Empire, Arrian comments that “Phrataphernes [commanded] the Parthians, Hyrcanians,
and Tapurians, all of whom were horsemen.” While it is impossible to determine if these
‘Parthians’ were the Parni people or not, the fact that they were all horsemen gives credence to
that possibility.
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Table 1: Parthian King List of the First Period, c. 247 – 124/3 BCE
c. 247 – 217 BCE
c. 217 – 191 BCE
c. 191 – 176 BCE
176 – 171 BCE
171 – 139/8 BCE
139/8 – 128 BCE
128 – 124/3 BCE

Arsaces I
Arsaces II
Phriapatius
Phraates I
Mithridates I
Phraates II
Artabanus I

The Parni invaders were temporarily pushed out in later years when the Seleucid king was
able to spare the royal army for actions in Parthia, but they very quickly returned when the king
and his army returned to the Seleucid capitol. With internal problems plaguing the Seleucid
Empire and requiring the king’s attention, Arsaces I was left as the de-facto ruler of Parthia and
parts of Hyrcania until his death in 217 BCE. His successor, Arsaces II, was challenged by
another Seleucid king, but was better able to repulse their attack and forced the Seleucids to
recognize the Parni as the legitimate rulers and client kings of the Seleucid Empire.56 Taking the
name of the province they conquered, the newly recognized Parthians, up to the ascension of
Mithridates I as king in 171 BCE, remained loyal enough that the Parthians are not mentioned in
any records during this period except to record the names of kings.57 This implies they acted in a
subservient-enough manner for the Seleucid kings to tolerate their presence. Had the Parthians
attempted to invade and claim further Seleucid territory, it would surely have been recorded
within Justin’s Epitome.
Mithridates I dominated the second half of Parthia’s first period. Ruling from 171 - 139/8
BCE, Mithridates I took the Parthians from the status of a client kingdom of the Seleucids to

56

Brosius, The Parthians, 86.

57

Justin, Epitome, 41.4-5.
34

imperial masters of the Iranian Plateau and Mesopotamia, independent in their own right.58 This
shift from kingdom to empire, from nomadic to semi-nomadic is not just a modern appellation to
this point in Parthian history, but a distinction that Mithridates was cognizant of and actively
engaged in its development. In his reign, the Parthian Empire began minting coins showing his
independence and kingship; the soft caps indicative of a steppe nomad that the kings once wore
were replaced on the coin with royal diadems.59 Not only does this mark the Parthians of
Mithridates’ time and beyond as rulers of empire, but it also shows a departure from their origins
to better dominate a series of settled peoples.
This pattern of nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples invading a settled area to eventually settle
themselves, forcing the resident power structure to acknowledge and legitimize their presence, is
a common one.60 In both Han China and Imperial Rome, the ‘legitimate’ state often first fought
nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples in battle, before grudgingly acknowledging their right to the
territory they claimed. The territory the Parthians expanded to encompass through Mithridates I’s
reign is not out of the norm in terms of geographical extent when compared to some of the
nomadic peoples that invaded China. The Parni-turned-Parthians of this period are typical and
exhibit no extraordinary attributes over any other nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples of the time.
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Parthia’s history, Han China and Imperial Rome certainly understood the dangerous
consequences of nomadic neighbors.
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The rise of the Parthian Empire in Mithridates’ reign gives evidence to this reasoning of the
Parthians as nothing out of the ordinary. Parthia, like most successful imperial projects, was able
to adapt itself to new circumstances. Additionally, the rise of the Parthian Empire is met in the
time of Mithridates and his direct successors with the same challenges that any empire faced,
especially those so close to the Central Asian steppe. In Parthia’s situation, it was a bitter
development. With the expansion of the new empire, the Parthians were beset with the exact
problem that so reduced Seleucid territory: nomadic peoples on the steppe threatening to raid
territory or, worse, invade with the intent to conquer.61 The kings of Parthia, like the Seleucids
before them, sent armies to the east and north to fend off nomadic groups harassing their borders,
leaving their western territories periodically undefended against most conventional settled
threats, like the reduced Seleucid Empire or the rising Roman state.
Added to the new threats along their borders, the Parthians also had to deal with their new
subject peoples that were culturally and politically different from their own. Keeping subjugated
peoples pliant and peaceful is ever the task of imperial rulers and is one that the Parthian kings
repeatedly dealt with before eventually succumbing to a particularly dangerous group: the
Sassanian Persians. All told, the Parthians exhibit much the same broad history as any other
empire: a rapid expansion of territory that brings political and social upheaval that is dealt with
as long as possible before the empire fractures or collapses.62
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This point is important, as it pertains to the origins of the Parthian people, as well as their
eventual collapse. The Parthians, by this argument, are not an oriental or ‘special’ people,
doomed by their biology and origin, but simply another people who will rise to rule an empire.
The traditional orientalist approach to these cultures is as much composed of delegitimizing their
rise as it is disempowering every other part of their history. The Parthian control over the Silk
Road propels them to dominance not only on the Iranian Plateau, but beyond into Mesopotamia,
Armenia, and Syria. The Parthians must be understood in relation to the economic achievement
they have with their position on the Silk Road and not as the oriental nomads subservient to the
military will and political machinations of Rome that is so often displayed.63

The Origins of the Silk Road
The formation and operation of the Silk Road shifted the course of the Parthian Empire.
Through their control over the western portions of the route, Parthia rose to prominence, and
through their later inability to maintain that control, gradually declined and finally collapsed.
Within this section, I will explore the foundations of the Silk Road and demonstrate its parallel
timeline with the first period of the Parthian Empire. In much the same time that the Parni people
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were establishing their kingdom within the province of Parthia, the nomadic Xiongnu of the
northern Chinese steppe were forcing the Han Empire to act to preserve their own territory.
The origins of the Silk Road are traced back to Han China, but might be better attributed to
the nomadic peoples of Central Asia, as they provided the impetus for Han China to embark on
the exploratory missions that eventually opened communication with the western regions.64 The
history of the Chinese state and the nomadic steppe dwellers in the north was a frequently violent
and almost entirely antagonistic one throughout this era.65 The Han Chinese, at constant war with
the Xiongnu steppe confederation since their rise to power in the late third century BCE, were
always looking for possible allies to use against the enemy. These allies were primarily nomadic
cultures themselves and were often peoples who had been abused by the Xiongnu in the past.
During one conflict in the late second century BCE, nearing the end of Parthia’s first period, the
Chinese emperor sent envoys to a nomadic people, the Yuehzhi, in the far west to ask for their
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aid against the Xiongnu.66 This envoy was rebuffed by the nomadic Yuehzhi, who had no desire
to return to northern China and fight the Xiongnu. However, they did provide information on
other semi-nomadic and settled peoples in the Transoxiana region; information that the envoys
were able to bring back to the Chinese emperor.67 Despite returning to the emperor with no
military allies, the expedition had still been useful. The knowledge of other settled peoples that
the Yuehzhi provided was valuable to the emperor. The Chinese, up to this point, had always
been geographically isolated by vast deserts, mountains, and jungles, with all the nomadic and
semi-nomadic peoples that lived within such environs and were rarely friendly to imperial
Chinese interests. The existence of other settled peoples, not so unlike China, presented the
possibility of either strong military allies, or wealthy “outer vassals” that could provide tribute to
the emperor.68 Only a few years after the first envoys returned, a new official diplomatic
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embassy was sent to the west to the peoples of Transoxiana, and to the Parthian Empire, fresh off
its imperial expansion in the midst of Mithridates II’s reign.
This new embassy was similarly disappointed in their search for direct military assistance
from any of these settled peoples. Travel from the heartland of China through the Tarim Basin
was difficult enough for relatively small groups of people; transporting military forces through
the region for use in conflict against the Xiongnu was a complete non-starter for the kingdoms of
Transoxiana and the Parthian Empire.69 Even China, supposed suzerain of many smaller groups
in the region, had trouble mounting military expeditions into the Tarim Basin, much less trying
to fight a war on the other side of it.70 Instead, the embassy focused on making agreements of
trade between the western kingdoms and the Chinese Empire. The most important result of these
agreements was the import into China of horses bred by the kingdoms of Transoxiana and
Parthia. These horses were of far better quality than Chinese bred horses and were prized as
weapons to be used against the Xiongnu, being given the name ‘heavenly horses’.71 In return for
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Central Asian horses, the Chinese traded luxury goods, silks primary among them, and the
famous trade route was born.72
It is here that I place the end of the Parthian’s first period. Their rise from obscurity on the
Central Asian steppe to their domination of the Iranian Plateau as an Empire is important, but
such a history could be told for many different cultures and peoples through time. The
establishment of the Silk Road and the profits extracted from its control propelled the Parthian
Empire to its position within the next two centuries.
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As Mark Edward Lewis comments, “the ‘Silk Road’ did not exist when the Han first sent
missions to Central Asia… trade increased only as a consequence of those first missions.”
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Chapter Three: Parthian Dominance
The opening of trade between Han China and Arsacid Parthia in the waning years of the
second century BCE marks the beginning of the second period of Parthian history, with its end
being marked in the second half of the first century CE as Parthia’s economic control over the
Silk Road trade and military dominance over Rome in the region ends. This section of the
historiography, around the opening of the Silk Road between China and Parthia, is a woefully
small part of modern historical works, but what little exists provides tantalizing ideas about the
effects it may have had.
Table 2: Parthian King List of the Second Period, 124/3 BCE – 76/80 CE
124/3 – 88/7 BCE
91/0 – 81/0 BCE
81/0 – 76/5 BCE
c. 78/7 – 71/0 BCE
71/0 – 58/7 BCE
58/7 BCE
58/7 – 38 BCE
38 – 3/2 BCE
2 BCE – 2 CE
4 – 6 CE
8/9 CE
10/11 – 38 CE
38 – 45 CE
43/4 – 51 CE
51 CE
51 – 76/80 CE

Mithridates II
Gotrarzes I
Orodes I
Sinatruces
Phraates III
Mithridates III
Orodes II
Phraates IV
Phraates V
Orodes III
Vonones I
Artabanus II
Vardanes
Gotarzes II
Vonones II
Vologeses I

Brosius puts forth the idea that burgeoning trade with China was “perhaps one of the
reasons why Mithridates II wanted to gain more control over the northwestern border of his
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empire, for in 97 [BCE] he subjected Armenia, an independent kingdom, to Parthian rule.” 73
Armenia, at this point in the history of the Parthian Empire, was far outside their core regions
within the Iranian Plateau and southern Mesopotamia; that Mithridates conducted military
operations with the intent to subject Armenia so far from his region of control suggests an
additional motive.74 I believe this motive was economic in nature, which can be reasoned from
the times that Armenia was considered valuable to Parthian interests combined with the
information known about the Steppe Road trade route, which was in operation at this time.
Brosius says nothing more on this topic, leaving it frustratingly vague especially when
considering only the overland Silk Road trade passing through the Iranian Plateau. Even during
the high-points of trade between Parthia and Rome, goods and coin did not flow through
Armenia, but through cities in Northern Mesopotamia and Syria like Palmyra. This leaves
Armenia out in terms of its independent economic value, but when one considers the goods
flowing in from the Eurasian steppe, Mithridates’ actions and Armenia’s value become more
tangible.
In the literature surrounding long-distance trade between Han China, Parthia, India, and
Rome, two main routes are discussed to the point of near exclusivity: the Silk Road overland
route through the Iranian Plateau, and the Spice Route between India and Egypt over the Indian
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Ocean. While both are certainly important and compose the vast majority of the luxury good
trade between these empires, a third route existed as well, waxing and waning in importance as
its neighboring trade routes fluctuated through the years. This Steppe Road, as Raoul
McLaughlin calls it, is not a new idea, but rather an economic exploration of traditional nomadic
movement across the Eurasian steppe.75 On this Steppe Road, goods were not transported by
merchant caravans or imperial envoys, but by the steppe people who populated the region. Goods
were acquired from China either through the raiding of settlements or the acquisition of tribute
and were transported across the Eurasian Steppe by the many tribes that populated the area.76
The end point of this Steppe Road is more nebulous than the Silk Road or Spice Route as
nomadic groups often traded with settled societies on the southern border of the Eurasian steppe
in Bactria and Transoxiana, making exact calculations difficult. However, McLaughlin argues
that much of the luxury goods that survived their passage on the steppe, made the journey north
of the Aral and Caspian Sea before terminating at trade posts on the Black Sea both north and
south of the Caucasus Mountains, an area controlled by Armenia.77
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With this context, the actions of Mithridates II start to make more sense. Having traded
luxury goods with Han China for over a decade by the beginning of the first century BCE,
Armenia represented two things: an additional source of luxury Chinese goods, and a potential
competitor to Parthian merchants in selling their own goods. For reasons related to their handling
of the Kushan Empire that I will explore in Chapter Four, I believe the former was a far more
driving concern to the Parthian kings than the latter.78

David Marshall Lang, Armenia: Cradle of Civilization (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970),
96.
Lang comments in his discussion on Urartu that,
In addition [to the east-west trade Urartu participated in,] the north-south trade route between
the Black Sea region, particularly prosperous Colchis, and Mesopotamia and Elam, passed
straight through Urartu.
This gives some indication towards the existence of trans-steppe trade enriching the cultures
around the Black Sea, even far before Parthia and the Silk Road emerges.
78

Stated briefly, the Arsacid Parthians had a pattern of acting positively to enhance their own

economic trading position, rather than acting negatively to damage the economic positions of
their neighbors and direct competitors. For example, The Parthians were far more likely to take
military and political actions that had a direct positive effect on their own trade activity, rather
than actions that hurt others’ trade activity, and that had a secondary positive effect on their own.
We see the Parthians acting to control Armenia and this inflow of luxury goods from the Steppe
Road, yet seemingly do nothing to curtail the later Kushans and their co-ordination with the
Roman Empire over the Spice Route.
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Whatever cause drove Mithridates II to subjugate Armenia, it was while meddling in their
affairs that the Parthians first encountered the Roman Republic, represented by then pro consule
Lucius Sulla, and made the first territorial agreement between the two powers marking the
Euphrates River as their territorial border.79 This agreement lasted for three decades, surviving
two political crises involving the expansionist actions of the Romans: one in 69 BCE with the
commander Lucullus threatening to attack an Armenian city and the other in 66-65 BCE with
Pompey looking to change the status quo.80 More than anything, the actions of Rome and Parthia
in the first forty years of the first century BCE are indicative of the two powers feeling out the
strengths and weaknesses of the other; an unsteady peace that violently collapsed in the 50s BCE
as the Triumvir Crassus made war on the Parthian Empire.
The beginning of open military conflict between the two powers resulted in a century and
more of Parthian dominance on battlefields largely outside their core territories. In 53 BCE, at
the Battle of Carrhae, the Parthians inflicted a brutal defeat upon Crassus, killing or capturing
tens of thousands of Roman soldiers and deporting the surviving captives to the eastern edge of
their empire.81 Within a decade of this victory, the Parthians launched a major raid into Roman
Syria and were only forced back after years of pillaging Roman territory. In 36-33 BCE, the
Parthians beat back a Roman invasion under Marc Antony, inflicting a major defeat upon the
general and killing tens of thousands more Roman soldiers. This series of losses convinced the
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expansionist and militaristic Rome to establish a peace in 20 BCE with Parthia that persisted for
half a century. Not until the 30s CE did Rome attempt to reestablish political and military control
over Armenia, prompting military action from the Parthians in the wars between 58 and 63 CE.82
This last set of conflicts, establishing a sort of dual control between Parthia and Rome
over Armenia, was also the last military conflict in this second period of Parthian history and the
last time for a century and a half that Parthia achieved military and political success against the
Romans. This military success is the most clearly visible hallmark of this second period of
Parthian history, but it does not exist in a vacuum. This is also the period of history where
Parthia saw the most success in controlling their economic interests in general and the Silk Road
in particular, with the socio-political benefits that naturally came from such success.
Rather than an oriental empire in decline due to claims of the ‘powerful nobility’ that
Debevoise and Colledge discuss, the Parthian Empire of this period was dominant, politically
and militarily.83 Rather than their repeated military conflicts with Rome fracturing their power,
the Parthians of this period presented a united front against Roman political intrigue and military
might. The Parthians not only controlled their own territory to great effectiveness but were also

82

Brosius, The Persians, 96-97.

83

It must be noted that being dominant in these two areas is often what the Roman state (or

certain Greek polities, or France, or England, or any other non-eastern state) is praised for. The
double standard that exists for the Parthians and other non-western polities is striking.
47

able to launch a major years-long raid into Roman territory and compete politically with the
Mediterranean superpower over the political fate of Armenia.84

The Silk Road of the Second Period
The economic control over the luxury goods trade, both on the Silk Road and the Steppe
Road, allowed the Parthians such success in this period. For this discussion, we turn once more
to Han China and the late second century BCE, for the true beginnings of the legendary trade
route.
Once the Han emperor and the governing elite knew of western settled peoples, trade
began quickly. By 119 BCE, the Han were able to reoccupy lands north of the Yellow River that
had previously been under Xiongnu control.85 By c. 111 BCE, Ssu-ma Ch’ien writes that “up to
ten trading caravans were setting west annually, sometimes comprising complements of several
hundred men.”86 In 104-102 BCE, the farthest commanderies of the northwest regions were
established, creating trade routes safe from the worst predations of the Xiongnu tribes, making
long distance trade a far safer activity. Less than a decade later, the Parthians subjugate Armenia,
cementing a new end-point for not only the Silk Road trade they had been benefiting from, but
also the Steppe Road and the goods that traveled upon it as well.87
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Moving briefly back to McLaughlin and the Steppe Road, it was once again Han Chinese
policy that drove the economic development of this trade route. With the Steppe Road luxury
goods originally obtained through raiding of Chinese towns and villages, there were frequent
reprisals and conflicts between the Xiongnu and Han living on their northern border. However,
developments in Han diplomatic strategies simplified the process greatly. Instead of trying to
fight the Xiongnu, the Han instead gave them annual bribes of coinage, silk, and food, with the
intent to mold the nomads into a form of economic domestication.88
By all measures, the Han Chinese seem to have been successful at this policy. The
Xiongnu of later years were less violent on the whole, and by the end of the first century BCE,
the Xiongnu were so indebted to Chinese economic activity that acquiring access to the border
markets of the Han became important parts of the nomadic diplomatic playbook.89 This
development is important to the discussion of the Steppe Road because it increased the quantity
of luxury goods entering the Eurasian steppe, thus increasing the quantity of luxury goods
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The Chinese officials believed that if they could make the Xiongnu dependent on Chinese goods
to live their daily life, they could create leverage over the Xiongnu that could be used to control
them. McLaughlin relates a Chinese warning to a Xiongnu ruler:
Your whole horde scarcely equals the population of a couple of Chinese prefectures.
The secret of your strength lies in your independence from China for all your real
necessities. Now you have this increasing fondness for Chinese things and the Xiongnu
customs are changing. Although the Han Empire sends no more than a fifth of its goods
here, it will in the end succeed in controlling the whole Xiongnu nation. (84)
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exiting the steppe in Armenia, increasing its value and sparking continued conflict over its
subjugation by both Rome and Parthia.
This transference of goods was almost certainly less efficient than the transfer of goods
along the Silk Road (or later along the Spice Route), but the Steppe Road was also almost
certainly in practical operation from long before the Silk Road was established, given our
understanding of Xiongnu raiding practices.90 This flow of luxuries may not have been
exceptionally valuable during the high points of trade along the Silk Road, where better quality
and larger quantities of goods could be transferred, but during slow periods of trade, the goods
that entered Parthia and Armenia from the steppe became increasingly valuable. As well, during
the opening of trade between China and Parthia, and later between Parthia and Rome, the wealth
that Parthia could extract from the merchants that traveled along the roads was passed on in price
to Roman merchants.91 This spurred Rome to seek out alternative sources of the luxuries coming
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While China remains the source of the luxury goods that Rome, Parthia and the Kushans fought
over, their economic policies meant that it didn’t matter much who was receiving their goods
past the Tarim Basin, demonstrated through the ease with which Indian and Kushan traders
replaced the Transoxianan Greeks who had previously dominated the Tarim Basin trade group.
Yu comments that, "on the whole it seems justifiable to say that the Chinese had a smaller
interest in the Roman trade than vice versa."
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across the Parthian Empire and gave them an interest in Armenia: that end point of the Steppe
Road.92
The Parthian and Roman interest in Armenia can only be satisfactorily explained through
this economic argument that has not been fully made before. Armenia served as a buffer state
between the Parthian Empire and Rome, providing them a non-native territory to fight over to
discourage more damaging wars upon their own territory, but this does little to fully explain why
Armenia became so important to either empire. The Parthians and Romans already had a
common border between Roman Syria and Parthian Mesopotamia, and the military importance
of Armenia to one side or the other was relatively small.93 Even when the two powers went to
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With their comment, “from now on, Armenia became a buffer state between Rome and Parthia,”
Barney and Lang argue that Armenia was indeed that buffer state, and provide the fact that Marc
Antony used Armenia to invade Parthia as evidence towards its importance, especially after the
Roman disaster at Carrhae. However, in that same section, they also acknowledge that Armenian
support during the invasion was so “lukewarm” that Antony later punished the king and family
and had them executed in Alexandria:
Roman losses were disastrous, and Mark Antony blamed these on Artavazd for his
lukewarm support. Mark Antony decided to punish him and subdue Armenia, but first
attempted to lure the Armenian king and his family to visit the court of Cleopatra in
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war, Armenia often acted independently, no matter which side currently had the region
subjugated. Not only does viewing Armenia as an economic end point of the Steppe Road
explain the fervor with which both Rome and Parthia acted to try and dominate the region, but it
also puts forward some explanation of why Parthia, in 216-7 CE reopened hostilities with Rome
and made Armenia a battleground once again. It is sufficient to say here that the known decline
in trade over the Spice Route and Silk Road due to war and disease caused a resurgence in
importance of the Steppe Road with their limited transmission of goods becoming a valuable
asset once more to a Parthian Empire attempting to regain its position of power. This will be
discussed in further depth in Chapter Five.
The Silk Road trade that Parthia oversaw greatly enriched the rulers of the Iranian Plateau
and continued to do so even through the various wars that were fought between Parthia and
Rome. Even during conflict between the two powers, Palmyra remained an intermediary trade
city, giving both sides a neutral place to buy and sell goods.94 Beyond this, we must understand
that the caravans traveling through Parthia were not technically ‘Parthian’ at all. It seems likely

Egypt. In 34 BC, Mark Antony suddenly invaded Armenia, and carried off Artavazd and
his family to Egypt, where Cleopatra had them murdered in 31 BC.
On Parthia’s status as a buffer state, they remark again on 204, that Armenia “remained a more
or less docile buffer state.”
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Perkins comments that, “Around the first century B.C. Dura began to grow in size and increase
in prosperity, presumably as a result of the initiation of the lucrative Palmyrene caravan trade.”
This trade was the Silk Road trade, which continues to match up with the timeline I have
proposed for the trade route’s rise.
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that the Parthians were primarily overseers in the Silk Road trade, facilitating safe routes for
caravans to travel upon and taxing those caravans to extract their wealth.95 The caravans
themselves were likely made up of local peoples moving goods from one end of their territorial
region to the other, transferring to other peoples as they went.96 As such, the caravans moving
between Parthian and Roman territory were likely Palmyrene, which gave them some immunity
from the conflicts that raged around them.97
This is not to say that the Parthians did not engage in limiting or changing the
relationship of trade through their empire, especially with Rome. For example, the Parthians
were able to use their control of the Silk Road and the merchants that plied its routes to their
advantage in making peace agreements. One of the terms of the peace agreement between
Parthia and Rome in 63 CE dictated that Palmyra was to be the only city of trade between the
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Parthians and the Romans, showing two things.98 First: that unrestricted trade across the entire
Roman-Parthian border was something Rome did not want, implying a discomfort with how
much wealth flowed from Roman coffers to Parthian ones, and second: that even though they
wished to curtail and regulate the Silk Road trade, Rome was unwilling to tolerate a total
cessation of luxury goods coming into the empire. This dynamic, and the desire for luxury goods
by the upper classes of Roman society provided the impetus for much of the next two hundred
years of Roman economic and political activity in the east.
The trade between Parthia and Rome had two major benefits for the Parthians. First, it
enriched Parthian coffers, whether indirectly through Roman coin that was spent crossing the
Parthian Empire or directly through the taxation of the caravans that traveled through their
territory. Second, this trade forced a tacit agreement between the Parthians and the Romans that
war between the two powers could not ever be too deleterious to economic operations, else both
sides suffer.
Towards the first benefit, there is clear evidence that Roman leadership was upset at the
state of economic affairs along their eastern border. Pliny the Elder commented that great effort
went into procuring Chinese silks so that “our ladies may in public display their charms,” while
Seneca the Elder commented of silks that “wretched flocks of maids labor so that the adulteress
may be visible through her thin dress, so that her husband has no more acquaintance than any
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outsider or foreigner with his wife’s body.”99 It is difficult to attribute this kind of writing to
simple moral fear mongering of Pliny or Seneca. Rather they are better seen as signs that the
Roman elite was coming to understand the problems with their consumption of luxury goods
from the Far East, made even clearer with the Senate’s attempt to ban the wearing of silk by men
in 14 BCE — an effort that went almost entirely ignored.100 Even the members of the Senate
were later berated by the emperor Tiberius for their wearing of silks and use of perfumes and
spices. These complaints are made in terms of concerns towards Roman morality, but it was
economic distress over the unequal trade that drove such actions.101
In discussing this unequal trade, Pliny does give some hard numbers to explore. Pliny
writes that Rome’s trade with India and Arabia cost the empire 50,000,000 sesterces a year while
their total trade with the Far East, including goods shipped from China through the Silk Road
came to a total cost of 100,000,000 sesterces lost per year.102 Even if these numbers are inflated
past the realm of reality, they provide good evidence of how prominent Romans thought the Silk
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Road and Spice Route trade affected them. Even if the trade wasn’t truly draining Roman coffers
of coin and goods, the fact that the Roman elite believed in the loss of wealth gives rationale for
their attempts in the east to either dominate Parthia or circumvent it entirely.
The domination of Parthia, as discussed above, was a greatly problematic issue for the
Romans of this period. Crassus and Marc Antony learned firsthand what the Parthians could
accomplish fighting in their own territory, and the Parthian excursion into Syria showed them to
be a dangerous force outside their homeland as well. Domination was a poor avenue to redress
economic woes, and over time the Romans turned instead to circumvention which, along with
the rise of the Kushans in the east, spelled the end of this second period of Parthian history, and
marked the birth of their third period.
The correlation between Parthian political and military success, and their economic
control of the Silk and Steppe Roads is unquestionably strong. As the Silk Road trade continued,
Parthia expanded their area of influence, and repeatedly met the Roman Republic and then
Empire on the field of battle, besting them each time and inflicting upon them vicious defeats.
Had the Parthians remained in such control over the Silk Road, or remained militarily dominant
as that economic control faltered, there would be less reason to believe this economic argument I
have provided. However, as I will explore in this next chapter, the Parthian fall from military and
political power, and the collapse of their economic control over the luxury goods trade went
hand-in-hand.
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Chapter Four: Parthian Decline
The third period in Parthian history saw the sudden shift from Parthian dominance to
military and political frailty in dealing with the aggressive Roman Empire. From the end of the
first century CE to the first decade of the third century CE, the Romans inflicted three major
military defeats upon the Parthians; defeats that occurred not in border regions like Armenia or
Syria, but in the heartland of Parthia itself: Mesopotamia. The Parthians of this period lost their
authority over not only Armenia, but also temporarily lost the entirety of Mesopotamia, and
permanently lost Northern Mesopotamia; regions that had been under core control for a hundred
years and more. Chronologically, this period begins with the reign of King Pacorus (77/8 - 108/9
CE) and it ends with the death of Vologeses V (191/2 - 207/8 CE), the third to the last king of
Parthia.
Table 3: Parthian King List of the Third Period, 78/9 – 207/8 CE
77/8 – 108/9 CE
77/8 CE
79-81 CE
108/9 – 127/8 CE
111/2 – 147/8 CE
147/8 – 191/2 CE
191/2 – 207/8 CE

Pacorus
Vologeses II
Artabanus III
Osroes
Vologeses III
Vologeses IV
Vologeses V

In 114 CE, the Romans launched an invasion deep into Mesopotamia and were able to
hold the entire region for three years before the next Roman emperor decided to pull the military
forces in the region back.103 However, unlike much of the back-and-forth conflict in the second
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period of Parthian history, this recall of Roman forces was not due to a resurgent Parthian
counterattack, but because of the unacceptable economic expenditure required to keep the
conquered territory pacified.104 The vast wealth that had once traveled through Mesopotamia and
into Roman Syria was evidently greatly diminished by this point, leading to the economic
decision to abandon the fertile region.105 Decades later, between 161 and 165 CE, the Romans
fully annexed Armenia and invaded Mesopotamia again, sacking the Parthian capital of
Ctesiphon. Thirty years after that, in 195-197 CE, the Romans under Septimus Severus invaded
Mesopotamia for a third time and annexed the northern half of the region, making it a part of the
Roman military frontier.106 It should also be noted that it is during the second century CE that

An argument exists that this war of Trajan's was driven by economic desires to conquer the
Parthian sections of the Silk Road, but I agree with Young in finding this motive suspect, given
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and the Silk Road was being cut off by the Kushan Empire.
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many discussions around Parthian internal politicking are made by historians, decrying the
internal weaknesses that provided the Roman Empire methods to sow dissent.107
This last invasion presents a possible contradiction in Roman logic from decades earlier.
Why annex a territory that had been economically barren less than a century earlier, especially
when leaving the territory to the Parthians provided such an effective raiding target? The answer
is evident: the territory of Northern Mesopotamia, especially regarding its position with
Armenia, became economically valuable once again with the likelihood of the Silk and Steppe
Roads coming back to the forefront of long-distance trade.

Roman Circumvention
As mentioned above, domination was a poor avenue for the Romans to redress economic
woes, and, perhaps realizing this, they turned slowly to circumvention and the Spice Route trade
between Egypt and India. This following discussion, so rooted in Roman economic and political
interests is vital to a discussion of Parthian economic history because of the place Rome held in
the ancient world’s economy. As a primary consumer of goods transported from China and India,
the question is not where the luxury goods ended up, but rather which imperial power had the
ability to levy taxes upon their transport. If Rome could only procure the luxury goods of China
and India through Parthian Silk Road, then Parthia had the ability to tax those goods and
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generate wealth from their transport. If Roman merchants were the ones transporting those goods
from India through the maritime Spice Route, then Rome had all the power to tax the goods and
pocket the profits made therein. This wealth that Rome will acquire was thus doubly important to
Parthian operations because it is wealth that is both removed from Parthian coffers, while it is
added to Roman ones. Finally, the greater the Romans’ control over the luxury trade, the less
inhibited they were in engaging in military actions against Parthia that might threaten the luxury
goods traveling over the Silk Road.
The integration of Egypt back into the empire after the Roman civil war marks the first
step in this process of circumvention. When Augustus stood triumphant as emperor of the entire
Roman world, it became possible to fully reopen and exploit maritime trade routes stretching
from Alexandria to India and beyond. These routes, once plied by Ptolemaic merchants, now had
the impetus of a united Roman Empire to drive trade once again.108 Through a textual analysis of
the kings of Arabia listed in the Periplus Maris Erythraei, scholars have determined the likely
period of writing to be in the first century CE, between 40 and 70 CE, right at the height of this
explosion in Roman trade.109 In his Res Gestae, Augustus boasts that, along with various other
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delegations, “embassies from kings in India were frequently sent to me; never before had they
been seen with any Roman commander.”110 Indeed, it was one of these embassies, reaching
Augustus around 26 BCE, along with another embassy several years later that provided the basis
for more focus to be placed on the maritime Spice Route trade, rather than the overland Silk
Road that was so dominated by the Parthians.111 The result of this initial trade was most likely
greater access to the spices and luxuries of India, with any Chinese luxury goods they received
only a byproduct of secondary trade routes that Indian merchants used to traveled up through
Central Asia.
It will be beneficial to take this moment to discuss the paths of goods traveling between
China, India, Parthia, and Rome. While there were many types of goods that were traded, this
discussion will focus specifically on the silks and spices that gave two of the trade paths their
names. Silk primarily traveled west of China through, traveled west of China through the Tarim
Basin and into Transoxiana.112 Here, the silk was either traded to merchants traveling through
Parthia along the Silk Road, or transported by other merchants down into India, that main
producer of spices traded on the Spice Route.113 From this point, once maritime trade was
established, both spices and silks were shipped from India to Roman Alexandria, where the
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goods were taxed and released into the wider Roman economic ecosystem. Thus, through
maritime trade with India, the Romans could mitigate the economic leverage that Parthia held
over them.
The benefits to this maritime trade were not simply economic though, as this
communication between Rome and the various Indian and semi-nomadic kingdoms allowed all
parties to put pressure on the Parthian Empire in other ways. McLaughlin comments that the
nomadic kingdoms which sent embassies to Augustus had the seeming goal of reducing Parthian
power in the region and may have wanted a firm alliance for when Rome did go to war in an
attempt to conquer Parthian territory.114 On the Roman side, the peace that was finally made
between Rome and Parthia in 20 BCE has been overstated as a Roman victory, perhaps most
vocally by the Emperor Augustus, but it may display another aspect of the importance the
economy and trade relations had on the actions of the Parthian Empire. With communications
opening between Rome and the various kingdoms in India, the Parthian elite must have seen the
potential military dangers of such friendships, prompting a desire on their part for peace, even
during a period where they were dominant. On the economic side, the Parthians may have also
reasoned, correctly, that if Rome could supplement their trade in luxuries to any degree through
that maritime route, then there was less potential economic and political blowback to a full
invasion of Parthian territory, further encouraging the Parthian elite to seek a lasting peace.115
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Matching with this Roman desire to communicate with the peoples of India, we see that
after his unification of the Roman Empire, Augustus put forth significant effort in cultivating
maritime trade through the Red Sea. An invasion force of more than 200 ships was created to
“conquer Arabia” and while such efforts failed, McLaughlin rightly concludes that “this
ambitious scheme must have established major shipbuilding facilities and supply lines on the
Red Sea coast;” infrastructure that was perfect for the facilitation of maritime trade with India.116
Not long after this infrastructure work Strabo wrote that “about 120 ships sail from MyosHormos to India, although, in the time of the Ptolemies, scarcely anyone would venture on this
voyage and the commerce with the Indies.”117 This comment, along with the writing and
proliferation of the Periplus indicates a strong desire at this point to establish new lines of trade
along this maritime route, strengthening the argument that the Roman Empire sought to
circumvent Parthian control over the luxury goods trade.118
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This maritime trade, and the taxation of goods coming through Alexandria made the
Roman Empire incredible amounts of wealth which in turn greatly increased their ability to
project power across the entirety of their empire. The Roman invasion of Britain under Emperor
Claudius in 43 CE and the organization of the conquests into the province of Britain shortly after
speak to the empire’s economic prosperity. The territory, like that of Dacia, conquered in the
early second century CE, cost more money to govern than it produced in taxation. It was only the
wealth that was generated by the maritime trade with India that allowed for such imperial excess.
Indeed, McLaughlin concludes that it was the maritime trade that “helped transform the new
Roman Empire into a regime that had unprecedented economic prosperity.”119 Through just the
maritime trade routed through Alexandria, “about a third of imperial finances were therefore
funded.”120
For all this wealth generation, the Parthian Empire of the first century CE remained an
implacable foe, seemingly unyielding against the threat of any Indo-Romano-Scythian alliance.
So long as Rome had to trade with Parthia for most of the eastern luxury goods they desired, the
Roman elite was limited in a practical sense in the military and economic solutions they could
utilize. The rise of the Kushan Empire in the second half of the first century CE, that upset
Parthian control of their trade combined with the rise of the Spice Route brought Rome into a
period of economic, military, and political dominance over the Parthian Empire.
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The Kushans
The Kushan Empire is even less well documented than the Parthians, though similar
kinds of sources are available from both Chinese and Roman texts.121 Debates rage on almost all
aspects of the Kushan Empire, from their origins, to the dating of their kings, to the veracity of
any evidence pertaining to them. This thesis will not delve into this debate, instead leaving it to
more specialized scholars like B. N. Puri in his chapter on The Kushans in a larger work on
Central Asian civilizations.122 The Kushans were likely an offshoot of the Yuehzhi nomads that
moved into Transoxiana after conflicts with the Xiongnu centuries earlier. The founder of the
Kushan Empire, Kujula Kadphises, rising to power sometime after 45 CE, conquered territory
from both the Parthians and the Indians through the latter half of the first century CE. This
territory was geographically focused in a single corridor from the Indian Sea straight north
through Transoxiana, including the territory of Kabul through which much of the Chinese
luxuries passed.123
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These conquests do not seem to have elicited much response from the Parthians.124 There
is one possible counterattack recorded by Josephus of the Parthian king Vologeses I (51 - 76/80
CE) rushing to defend his kingdom from a sudden foreign attack, but nothing more.125 Given the
dates of Vologeses’ reign and the rise of the Kushans in the mid-first century CE, it is likely this
was in response to the Kushans, however the generally poor availability of information
pertaining to the eastern half of the Parthian Empire make it difficult to claim anything with
certainty. A more compelling argument could be made that the settling of the Kushans relieved
the Parthians of needing to continually repel nomadic incursions from the northeastern part of
their empire. In short, with the rise of the Kushan Empire, a buffer zone between Parthian
territory and the fully nomadic steppe people was established. With this buffer zone in place,
Parthian kings were free of the need to patrol and defend those borders against the intermittent
raids, as now the settled Kushans experienced the brunt of those attacks.126
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The Kushan Empire is key to understanding the decline of the Parthians during this third
period because with the arrival of the Kushans in the first century CE, the territory to the west of
the Tarim Basin, China’s primary path for exporting luxury goods, was consolidated under a
single, unified power.127 Where before caravans from China traveled through the Tarim Basin to
the Greco-Bactrian cities of Transoxiana and from there send their goods west to Parthia, south
to India, or even north to the steppe, those luxury goods now traveled through the Tarim Basin
into exclusively Kushan hands. The Kushan Empire controlled the availability of the Chinese
caravans, where no such power had existed before. The region had historically been controlled
by a constantly shifting power struggle between Greco-Bactrian, Indo-Scythian, and other semi
nomadic forces like the Indo-Parthians.128 The consolidation of this region in the mid to late first
century CE under a singular administrative force changed how trade occurred, with the likely
antagonistic relationship between the Kushans and the Parthians limiting the latter’s capacity to
engage in commerce even further. With the conquest of the southern Indus territories leading to
the Indian Ocean in the 90s CE, this situation was amplified as the Kushans gained direct access
to the burgeoning maritime trade of the Spice Route.129
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I date the end of the Parthian Empire’s second, and most successful, period to the death
of King Vologeses in 76/80 CE. By this point, it had been nearly two decades since the truce
made with Rome over the governance of Armenia and about two decades since the Kushans had
begun their expansions. By this point, as per the arguments of this thesis, the profit gained
through the Parthian Silk Road had begun to decline as the volume of luxury goods traveling
through Parthian territory diminished. This may not have been immediately noticeable by the
Parthian nobility given that it was their subject peoples who transported and operated the actual
trade routes through the empire. Two decades from this point, however, the Kushans controlled
the entire corridor from the Tarim Basin to the Indian Ocean, where they began trading directly
with Roman merchants who had been visiting India to trade with the locals for decades. In 114
CE, the Romans invade the Parthian Empire to conquer, claiming not only Armenia, but also the
entire territory of Mesopotamia, by far a greater conquest than they had ever attempted before.
That the Parthian military structure was so diminished in its quality and effectiveness over only
two generations from 63 CE to 114 CE, as argued by the likes of Rawlinson and Debevoise,
makes little sense. However, if the Parthian coffers were undergoing a draining of their funds
and a severe economic crisis, such diminishment becomes almost a certainty.
In this third period, the Parthian Empire, economically strangled by the rise of the
Kushans taking control of Chinese luxury goods combined with the rise of the Spice Route
between Egypt and India, began to feel the economic effects in all areas of their governance.
Maintenance and upkeep on the infrastructure of the Parthian Empire began to falter, and local
populations felt the burden of an increased taxation to make up for the lost trade revenue, to say
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nothing of their military expenditures. The core Parthian army was composed of the nobility
fighting from horseback, but any supplementary forces had to be paid for in coin. There is no
evidence that an Achaemenid style ‘hatru’ system existed to recruit or train soldiers for the army
and it is likely that the Parthians, like their Sassanian successors, utilized mercenary forces for
much of their infantry.130 These supplementary forces, whether contracted mercenaries or levies
of subject peoples, required payment; something the Parthian Empire had been fully capable of
delivering while they had control over the Silk Road and its profits. Once that revenue dwindled,
it was only a matter of time for the Parthian treasury to be depleted to a point where they could
not muster the military forces necessary to repel a Roman invasion.131
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University Press, 1983), 296.
Sellwood mentions a period of twenty-five years after 96 CE that no tetradrachms were struck at
Seleucia, concluding that this lack of production might coincide with a succession crisis within
the Empire. With the evidence available, I believe it just as valid to conclude that the loss of Silk
Road trade slowed the capabilities of the Seleucia mint that it could not produce coinage in the
quantity it had previously.
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More than that, the Roman response to their victory in Mesopotamia adds evidence to
this theory. It was not a Parthian counterattack or insurgent behavior that led the Romans to
abandon their conquest only three years later in 117 CE, but the economic expenditure required
to maintain Roman control of the territory becoming exorbitantly high.132 In his Economic Life of
the Ancient World, Levy comments that in 117 CE, “if conquest ceased immediately after Trajan,
it was because the coffers were almost empty.”133 Had Chinese luxury goods been continually
trafficked over the Parthian Silk Road into Mesopotamia, this economic burden would have been
ameliorated, and Rome’s coffers could have handled the economic stress. With these goods
being diverted entirely into the maritime Spice Route via India, Mesopotamia’s value to Rome
was greatly reduced and abandoning everything past Armenia, and thus past the end point of the
Steppe Road, became a reasonable action.134
This victory of Rome’s was also not a fluke as the trend of Parthian failures only
continued through the end of the second century CE. I also reject the theory that Rome had
developed some new military strategy or political willpower that allowed them to dominate the
Parthians. To wit, the Parthians had always been effective at adapting to the military strategies of
the Romans, which had allowed them to devastate Roman armies capably at Carrhae or
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Phraaspa.135 That they were suddenly unable to mount a defense of their core territories implies
something had structurally changed within the Parthian Empire. Along with my rejection of the
oriental decline theory of earlier Parthian histories discussed in Chapter One, the deprivation of
revenue from the Silk Road becomes the preeminent reason for their broad series of failures. The
Romans invaded again in 161 CE to sack Ctesiphon, but again annexed no territory. It was only
in 195-7 CE that Northern Mesopotamia is permanently annexed by the Emperor Septimus
Severus. Like with the rise of the Kushans and the exploitation of the Spice Route, the economic
forces driving the politics of Western Asia shifted, and the Parthia’s fortune briefly turned as the
Silk and Steppe Roads become powerful economic factors once again.
The Parthians of this period are strangers to the Parthians of the last. Where once they
were successful in their ventures, political and military, at this point they were forced ever
further back into the Iranian Plateau, unable to resist Roman advances. Without examining the
economic situation the Parthians found themselves, the rise of the Kushans, and the beginning of
the Spice Route trade, their general collapse can seem predestined. However, when such
economic ideas are considered, their general failure in this third period is understandable, and
their surprising resurgence in the last two decades of their rule becomes explainable.
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Chapter Five: Parthian Resurgence and Sassanian Beginnings
The last period of Parthian history is the most vexing for historians looking at the broad
sweep of the Parthian decline and collapse. Chronologically the shortest period in my
classification, beginning with the rise of Vologeses VI to power in 207/8 CE and ending with the
fall of his successor Artabanus IV in 224 CE, this fourth period of Parthian history is notable for
two events: the final Parthian war with Rome, and the Persian rebellion that ended the Parthian
Empire. While the rise of the Sassanian Persians in rebellion is what ended the Arsacid dynasty,
it is the war with Rome that complicates the historical narrative.
Table 4: Parthian King List of the Fourth Period, 207/8 – 224 CE
207/8 – 221/2 CE
213 – 224 CE

Vologeses VI
Artabanus IV

In 216-7 CE, the Romans and Parthians clashed in battle over Armenia resulting in a
devastating Roman defeat at the battle of Nisibis. This event alone is noteworthy in the history of
Parthia given their declining situation over the last century, but the simple location of the conflict
eclipses even that. With the territorial losses Parthia had suffered at Rome’s hands, any conflict
could reasonably be expected to occur within Mesopotamia, close to the current holdings of the
Parthians, but this battle at Nisibis was fought far outside the Parthian area of influence, making
the victory even more unlikely. To cap everything off, the peace that was signed by Rome after
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the battle was not simply an agreement to cease hostilities; it also included war reparations
demanded by the Parthians and dutifully paid by the Romans of perhaps fifty million denarii.136
Simply put, this conflict and its outcome forces the existing theories of Parthian decline
and collapse to either ignore these events entirely, or pretend such unlikely circumstances simply
happened as a fluke of history. After all, Rawlinson’s decrepit, oriental Parthia has no business
even resisting the might of the Roman Empire in 216 CE, much less beating them on a field of
battle far outside their controlled territory and forcing a humiliating peace upon them.
Debevoise’ fractious nobility should have stopped any effective Parthian warmongering before
they even left their territory, much less facilitated such a conflict so far outside their holdings.
One might dismiss this conflict as a fluke, or the last gasp of a dying empire given that
the Parthians fall less than a decade after this battle to internal rebellion by the Sassanian
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This number is as suspect as Pliny's number from Chapter Three, as it is Romans writing of this
loss. Those same Romans could easily have had political reasons for inflating the cost of peace
with Parthia, either to discredit the emperor for starting the war, or to publicly shame him for
ending it. If this number is compared to Pliny's complaint of the 100,000,000 sesterces lost each
year to trading with the east, this cost of 50,000,000 denarii becomes 200,000,000 sesterces
when converting the values directly. However, some caution must be utilized here as the value of
Roman currency was debased over the century and more between Pliny's statement and the
Battle of Nisibis. However, even with the debasement of the currency, this bulk payment would
have been significant, equaling or exceeding the costs that Pliny bemoaned.
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Persians. However, as I will show, if one examines this conflict through that same economic
lens, taking issues of long distance trade and the outbreak of deadly disease into consideration,
then the Parthian victory over Rome at Nisibis and their fall to the Sassanian Persians less than a
decade later become reasonable.

The Collapse of the Spice Route
Between 165 and 180 CE, the Roman Empire suffered under what was to be called the
‘Antonine Plague.’ This disease killed upwards of 10% of the entire Roman population and has
been theorized to be a major element of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire itself.137 The
plague was first reported in Parthia in 165 during the Roman invasion, where it quickly spreads
through the army and the densely populated Roman East.138 This plague, likely originating in
China where it spread along the Silk Road to Central Asia, India, and Parthia, was devastating to
the densely populated civilizations along the long distance trade routes. Shortly after its
beginning, maritime trade along the Spice Route slowed and essentially ceased, leaving the
Kushans with an excess in luxury goods and no Roman merchant ships with which to trade.139
With the Spice Route so damaged, those luxury goods began traveling once again along the Silk
Road through Parthia, albeit slowly.
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This plague crippled the empires along the Silk Road at least until it had run its course,
with its time traveling through the Iranian Plateau explaining why Parthia was unable to take full
advantage of the renewed trade likely flowing through their territory. Beyond the actual death
that such a plague caused, the random nature of those who fell ill sowed chaos through all the
institutions of empire. Those empires with a more bureaucratic system would have posts left
empty across their territory as the skilled figures who once inhabited them fell ill and died. Such
a plague made the continued, organized exploitation of any resource more difficult and made
recovering the knowledge of that organization more difficult still. In short, the organized and
active exploitation of the Spice Route by the Roman Empire suffered far more damage than the
relatively hands-off exploitation of the Silk Road in which the Parthian Empire was engaged.
This, along with the chaos that more densely populated cities, common in urban empires like
China or Rome, underwent during such a plague provides a rationale for the collapse of Roman
economic control of the Spice Route.
The renewed trade through Parthia’s Silk Road made Northern Mesopotamia
economically valuable once again, giving the Emperor Septimus Severus reason to invade and
annex the territory in the 190s CE. Parthia, perhaps recovering from the Antonine Plague and
still recovering from the once-atrophied trade route can be easily understood as susceptible to the
might of the Roman Empire, however where Rome had lost the incomes of the Spice Route,
Parthia had regained their Silk Road income and began to engage in those actions that the
Parthians of their second period once had.140
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We see the return of Silk Road revenues in the evidence that this war of 216-7 provides.
For the Parthians to best the Romans on an external field of battle in a manner near identical to
their victories in their second period indicates a military and political infrastructure strengthened
by the same economic base that made it so strong before. Not only this, but that the war occurred
primarily in Armenia points to a renewed Parthian interest in Armenia; an interest that had
historically only occurred when the Silk Road was in full swing and the Parthians wished to
control the only other source of luxury goods: the Steppe Road.
As I have argued above, Armenia held little strategic value in terms of a buffer state
between Rome and Parthia, especially since the Romans annexed Northern Mesopotamia at the
end of the second century CE. Armenia’s importance lay in its geographical position as the endpoint of the Steppe Road trade route and a point to offload those same Chinese luxury goods that
Rome had worked so hard for in circumventing Parthia. In the early third century CE, Armenia
had the same importance as it had since the beginning of the Silk Road at the end of the first
century BCE when Mithridates I first subjugated Armenia to Parthian rule. With the Spice Route
essentially defunct for the current Roman Empire, and the renewed control of luxury goods trade
by the Parthians, the Steppe Road and Armenia provided the only source of luxury goods not
controlled by a bitter enemy of the Romans. This is why Parthia of 216-7 was so interested in
Armenia and why they went to war with Rome in that territory.

eastern Roman territories, and Rome had abandoned Mesopotamia before due to the excessive
cost in holding it. Given this information, it is clear that something had drastically changed in the
appraisal of Parthian Mesopotamia, and all signs point towards a reemergence of the Silk Road
and all the profits that went with it.
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The Rise of the Sassanian Empire
In 224 CE, the history of the Parthian Empire came to a close. While Armenia retained an
Arsacid king for the next two centuries, the Arsacid Dynasty of the Parthian Empire was
eliminated. However, the empire that rose out of the Parthian’s ashes is just as important to this
thesis as any period of the Parthians because of how their imperial fortunes so closely follow the
economic argument I have laid out.
The rise of the Sassanian Empire closes out the Arsacid dynasty on the Iranian Plateau,
but the effects and institutions of the Parthian Empire lived on long after their collapse. In
particular, many of the criticisms leveled against the Parthians as reasons for their decline were
present in the Sassanian Empire from the very beginning yet seem to affect the Sassanian rise to
power very little. Within this epilogue to the Parthian Empire, I will explore the basic
chronological structure of Sassanian history and compare their broad successes and failures to
their control over the same long-distance trade routes with which the Parthians interacted. With
this structure in place, I will then tackle one of the arguments that has been made towards
Parthia’s decline – the existence of a powerful nobility – and show how this exact situation was
present in Sassanian politics throughout their reign; evidence towards my economic thesis and
against the orientalist theories of the past.
I will split the Sassanian period of domination into three parts: their rise and
consolidation of the eastern empire, their domination over Rome and consolidation of the
western empire, and their fall to the Muslim invasions. These divisions are rough at best, given
the general Parthia-focused nature of this thesis. While I cannot argue for deep truths about the
Sassanian Empire in such a short section, this exploration will elaborate how the trends and
forces that so significantly affected the Parthians affected their successors as well.
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The first period of Sassanian history can be constrained by those years from their
usurpation of the Parthian Empire and its core territories in 224 CE to the eve of Shapur II’s
ascension as King of Kings in 309 CE. During this first period, the Sassanians acted much as the
Parthians had during their own foundational period, establishing political and diplomatic control
over their new territories, as well as waging war on those neighbors deemed weak or valuable
enough. Clifford Ando comments in his book on Rome during the third century crisis that,
Ardashir’s penetration of Roman territory in 230 was only the beginning. Across the
next half century, Rome would reap what it had sown: foreign military forces would
make a mockery of the frontiers, crossing the Rhine and Danube in violence, sailing the
Hellespont and sacking the cities of Syria and the east.141

There were six significant clashes between Roman and Sassanian forces, with all but one of
the conflicts contained within Mesopotamia and Syria, that common battlefield between
Rome and the now fallen Parthian Empire.142 It is telling that the one conflict outside Syria
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230-2 CE – Major Sassanian Raid into Northern Mesopotamia and Syria that Rome

eventually repulsed.
238-44 CE – The Sassanian Empire invades Northern Mesopotamia, but the war ends
inconclusively.
253 CE – Major Roman defeat at the Battle of Barbalissos within Syria.
258-60 CE – The Sassanian Empire invades Syria again and captures the Roman Emperor at the
Battle of Edessa.
283 CE – Rome invades Southern Mesopotamia and sacks Ctesiphon.
296-8 CE – The Sassanian Empire invades Syria and Armenia, besting the Romans at Carrhae
78

or Mesopotamia was not further inside the Sassanian domain, but back into Armenia in 2968 CE, reinforcing the importance historians must give to Armenia and the clear economic
benefits that I have enumerated above. While the conflicts were less than deterministic
towards the final fate of both empires, it is important to note that the conflicts were slowly
moving closer to Roman zones of control, implying the Sassanians were accruing increased
power. Rome continued to fend off Sassanian attacks for a time but their control over the
region and their Iranian neighbors was weakening.
I propose the exact same theory towards the steadily increasing power of the
Sassanian Empire as I have proposed towards the rise and fall of the Parthian Empire. As the
Sassanians were able to consolidate control over the long-distance trade routes and claim the
profits gained from such control, their political and military dominance in the region
increased accordingly. Fresh off their conquests of the Parthian Empire, and their raiding
into Roman Mesopotamia in the 230s CE, the Sassanian Empire turned east and brought
their military might down upon the Kushan Empire, smashing Kushan control over the
territory west of the Tarim Basin and pushing them back into Northeast India.143 With this
action, the Sassanian Empire now had a direct source of Chinese luxury goods that
invigorated their military and political efforts, easily visible in their steadily improving
fortunes in conflicts with the Roman Empire. It is, in fact, little surprise that once this
thoroughly renewed Silk Road trade had some time to reestablish itself, the Sassanians and
Romans move into a period where the Sassanians definitively held the military advantage
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and the Roman Empire began making ‘eternal peaces’ once more as they did when Parthia
held the same advantage.
The second period of Sassanian history spanned the rise of Shapur II during his long
and fruitful reign in 309 CE to the end of Khosrow II’s reign in 628 CE. During this period,
the Sassanians forced the Romans to pay vast amounts of tribute to them twice, killed a
Roman emperor on the field of battle, conquered all of Mesopotamia and parts of Armenia
again, took for a period of sixteen years the territory of Syria, Egypt, Palestine, and Rhodes
– which had never been taken from Rome by an Iranian power before – and were even able
to besiege the walls of Constantinople itself. These three hundred years speak to a Sassanian
Empire growing ever more dominant over their Roman neighbors, even considering the
peace that Rome was able to broker that restored a status quo eerily similar to earlier peaces
between the Parthians and the Romans. This dominance comes almost entirely from their
exploitation of not only the Silk Road, but also their control over Armenia and their later
control over the Spice Route as well.144 With control of all three major trade routes
transporting luxury goods, the Roman elite had no choice but to funnel immense amounts of
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and conquer Eudamon (Modern day Aden) of Southern Arabia, a strange conquest unless the
intent was to dominate the Spice Route trade traveling towards Egypt. In fact, it seems like
neither Khosrow or his successors cared for anything more than controlling the entrance to the
Red Sea and the territory directly adjacent to it, providing all the domination of trade they
required. This final conquest of the Spice Route trade occurs in the second half of the sixth
century CE, with Constantinople nearly falling to Sassanian invaders less than a century later.
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money back to their new Iranian rivals. Combined with a Roman Empire deprived of their
naval access to Chinese luxuries, and the significant taxes levied upon the goods once they
entered the Roman Empire, this theory towards Roman foreign policy is simple and
persuasive.
The last period of Sassanian history describes their quick collapse. I struggle to
describe this collapse purely because of the speed with which it occurred. In fact, for an
empire that so closely entwined itself in the near-mythical history of the Achaemenid
Persians, the Sassanian’s fall provides a striking parallel to the collapse of the old Persian
Empire. The Achaemenid Empire fell to Alexander the Great’s invasion in only a few
months’ time, and the Sassanian Persian’s own fall to the Muslim Invasions took little
longer. From their high point of victory against Rome and near-total domination of the longdistance luxury goods’ trade, the Sassanian Empire fell quickly, its institutions overwhelmed
by the invading Muslim armies.
Thus, the Sassanian’s history in brief is told, detailing its rise to prominence with the
conquest of Kushan territory and reacquisition of control over the Silk Road, its threehundred-year dominance of Rome in the east and further consolidation over the Steppe Road
and Spice Route, and its final fall to a new, upstart imperial force. Within this period of
time, the Sassanian Empire was ruled by a monarchy that older historians called oriental,
ruled over a people that warranted the same appellation, and fell to invaders in such a
manner that made a mockery of both Achaemenid Persia and Arsacid Parthia from those
same older historians. While each of these could – and should – be unpacked within a
greater thesis devoted to such themes, I want to discuss in brief a fourth argument, made by
Debevoise and Colledge, against the Parthian Empire that was so deeply ingrained in the
81

Sassanian royal court that its complete irrelevance must make us question its relevance to
the history of the Parthians themselves: the powerful nobility.
This argument, first made in the English historiography within Debevoise’ Political
History of Parthia, claimed that the fractious nobility of the Parthian Empire led to
infighting and political intrigue within the Parthian court, weakening the political structure
of the Parthian Empire and opening them to defeat by Roman invaders.145 The problem with
this argument is that it presupposes that one particular version of rule was superior to
another. In this case, it is based on ideas that the absolute monarchs of western Europe who
ruled over a weak class of nobility makes an inherently stronger empire than cultures that
operate differently. If a government was not republican – within the constraints of the
Roman system – or democratic – within the constraints of particular Greek city-states – it
must at the very least be ruled by a singular figure passing down power in as strict a fashion
as possible.146 With such an idealistic view of imperial rule, this meant that the practices of
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That is, of course, when the culture in question was situated outside of Europe. This same logic,
turned on its head, is used to exemplify the Macedonian kingdom as, if not one of its strengths,
part of what forged the figures of Philip II and Alexander the Great. From the death of Amyntas I
in 498/7 on, nearly every Macedonian succession is plagued with reports of court intrigue,
political assassination, or other chicanery by the Argead nobility.
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Parthian noble clans having significant power in raising or deposing their king is seen in the
light of powerful nobles who weaken their own political system through their scheming,
rather than simply a different political construct. Debevoise gives this very idea the credit
for the Parthian decline and collapse, while completely ignoring the fact that the transition
from Arsacid to Sassanian rule was not so much a massive overhaul in the structure of the
empire, but rather a shifting of which family had the right to sit on the throne.
Let there be no misunderstanding: the Sassanian dynasty that ruled the new Persian
Empire was ‘Persian’ and not Parthian as they hailed from Esfahan and Fars, where Persia
gets its name. However, the broad structure of the new Persian Empire was not widely
governed by Persians, but by those same noble families that had governed the empire under
Arsacid rule. Just like under the Parthians, the powerful Parthian nobility continued to exert
political, social, and military power on the ruling Sassanian court just as they had on the
Arsacid court, yet the Sassanian Empire survived for four hundred years. Debevoise’ cause
of the Parthian collapse, being wholly present in this next iteration of imperial Iran does
nothing to significantly hamper their capabilities. The argument around a powerful nobility
is easy to accept because it so clearly delineates reasons that do not require delving into the
economic or social aspects of a foreign culture. However, for those cultures that practice
such political actions, a powerful nobility does not act as destabilizers of empire, but as the
foundation of imperial power. Through these noble families, Arsacid – and later Sassanian –
power was spread across the Iranian Plateau and beyond, both west to Mesopotamia, Syria,
and Armenia, as well as east to Transoxiana and northwest India.
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Chapter Six: Conclusions and Future Research
The greatest criticism of this work is known to me: that I am reaching for the conclusions
I make given the scarcity of available evidence; that what little evidence is available acts, as
Rezakhani puts it, as “a collection of disjointed islands” with “no bridges to be seen and… no
map with which to understand the position of each island.”147 Further, the conclusions that I
draw are far outside the realm of more common arguments around the Parthian Empire, normally
drawing as they do from the evidence that numismatics, art history, religious studies, and
philology allow. This is the struggle of studying history, especially of periods prior to mass
literacy and the easy proliferation of information. The nature of ancient history leads to a number
of less-than-desirable amounts of evidence to argue for certain conclusions, and when one
considers an empire like the Parthians, for whom less evidence survives than from other ancient
peoples, the problem is only compounded.
In particular, the question around correlation and causation within this thesis can be
considered problematic. After all, most everyone knows that "correlation does not imply
causation." However, the very success of this pithy phrase has led it to be greatly abused,
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written for us by the unequal preservation of traces of the past. (164)
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especially outside the field of statistics that it was born into. Dismissing an argument for being
grounded in correlative relationships is as bad as misusing those same correlations to imply
extreme causations.148 Beyond spuriously dismissing claims out of hand, the admonition that
'correlation does not imply causation' is most often utilized to shut down conversation and
argumentation, instead of using the correlation in question to delve deeper into the problem at
hand.149
An example of a correlation which cannot be causation would be the claim that the
Parthian Empire declined due to its powerful nobility, because as I showed above, the evidence
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available around the Parthian Empire show that their powerful nobility had little to no effect on
Parthian success until the late first century CE, hundreds of years after their founding. Further,
when the Sassanian Persians overthrew the Parthians, their empire rose to power with that exact
same powerful nobility existing and having little to no negative effect upon them. This would be
a misuse of correlation as causation because the evidence we have contradicts the idea that a
powerful nobility leads to imperial decline.150
The Parthian Empire's success is highly positively correlated with their control over the
Silk Road and Steppe Road trade routes, as shown above by the compared timelines of each of
these entities' rise and fall from importance. I used this correlation as a starting point that led to
further investigation in which I found no data that fundamentally disagrees with this argument
and only evidence that agrees with the broader thesis. With this correlation, a simple argument
has been proposed: that control over the long-distance trade routes moving through and around
Iran caused the masters of those routes to be more imperially successful. With this hypothesis we
can examine the Parthian, Sassanian, and early Islamic empires within Iran to see how
effectively it functions. The Parthians obviously fit perfectly within this framework, as this thesis
has expounded upon, and the Sassanians see the same increase in imperial success as they gain
further control over the Silk Road and Spice Route. Then, with the rise of Islam and the Muslim
Conquests, these conquests are reversed, and the Sassanians fall.151
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The most important conclusion that can be drawn from a strong correlation is the
existence of a relationship between the two factors being studied. I believe that I have
sufficiently shown a causal relationship between the Parthian's control over the long-distance
trade routes and their success. The Silk Road was not prosperous because the Persians or
Parthians succeeded. This is clear from the fact that the Persians and Parthians had no
fundamental control over either the very beginning or the very end of the Silk Road. Rather, the
Persians and Parthians were successful because the Silk Road was prosperous. Even if further
evidence arises that challenges my conclusion, it will only shed further light upon this political
and economic relationship and provide a better starting point to further discuss the Parthian
Empire than the works of Rawlinson, Debevoise, or Colledge.
Questions also arise around the Kushan Empire and the Parthian response to their rise,
considering they are such an important part of this thesis. For the Kushans, the conquering of
their empire allowed them to engage in highly lucrative trade directly with the Romans while
also weakening their neighbors: the Parthians. Why didn’t the Arsacid kings make more of an
effort to fight the Kushans and attempt to reclaim their lost territory?152 I propose that the
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ignore the actions of the Kushans.
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greatest immediate threat the Parthians faced on any front, aside from their border with the
Roman Republic and Empire, was the nomadic groups that perpetually raided Parthian territory.
These nomadic groups, including Indo-Scythian like the Kushan’s progenitors, were as difficult
for Parthia to combat with their military structures as it was for Republican Roman armies to
combat the Parthians.
The inherent power of the nomadic raiders to simply melt away into the steppe made
them a constant annoyance, if not a deadly, existential threat.153 In fact, we know this was a dire
problem for early Parthian kings.154 King Phraates II died fighting marauding war bands of
nomadic Saka in 128 BCE, and his direct successor King Artabanus was mortally wounded
fighting invading Yuehzhi four years later.155 Though our records of the eastern Parthian Empire
are scarce, these sorts of nomadic incursions were regular threats to Parthian control.
With the invasion and consolidation of the Kushan Empire as a settled society,
controlling distinct amounts of territory, the Parthian’s neighbors shifted from nomadic raiders to
settled farmers and traders. This shift meant that it was now the Kushans who had to deal with
nomadic groups harrying their borders, freeing the Parthians from such responsibilities. I argue
that even though the Kushans conquered Parthian territory, and deprived them of the direct Silk
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Road trade, the Parthian leadership found the cessation of border security as a constant threat
beneficial and thus acceptable. The relationship between the two powers may have never been
cordial, but aside from a single reference in Josephus of King Vologeses I taking the army east,
there are no records to imply regular conflict ever occurred between the two powers.156 If this
was the full extent of the Parthian reaction to the Kushan invasion, then this minimal response
was a clear miscalculation that led to the decline and later collapse of the empire.
Towards Rome and their participation in the Silk Road, and more particularly their role in
the Spice Route, one common argument exists around whether the maritime trade should truly be
given such prominence within the broader economic fortunes of the empire. Some credit for this
prosperity must absolutely be given to the Pax Romana in the Mediterranean, which in the years
following Augustus’ unification of the empire allowed for more efficient and profit-generating
taxation of Roman subjects. However, the timing of Rome’s control over the Spice Route pairing
almost perfectly with their greatest territorial extent is too coincidental. This territorial peak,
reached in the early second century CE when their trade with India was in full force, began to
degrade as trade with India faltered, indicating the essential nature of the maritime trade to
imperial operations.
Causation must also be considered in this question. Did the maritime trade with Egypt
thrive because of a united, unified Roman Empire, or did the maritime trade bolster the empire to
allow for such a large unified dominion? Did the faltering maritime trade in the later second and
third centuries CE spur a decline in the Roman Empire, or did disruptive forces from within
make administrating the maritime trade an effort the flailing government could not expend effort
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on anymore? In the end, with the sources available, there are no definitive answers towards this
question beyond the standard response.
Maritime trade with India, like any importance of Parthia to Roman actions, has been
downplayed in Roman histories and sometimes omitted entirely in favor of a narrative that places
agency entirely upon Roman actions. This line of thought argues that Rome went into a decline
because of a string of ineffective emperors, or because of deleterious actions that Rome took;
anything to argue that it was Roman agency that determined the empire’s fate and not anything
else. Like my broader argument on Parthia, I advocate for an alternative economic explanation
that places great value upon a vector of massive wealth generation during a period where Rome
was both expanding their territorial dominion and paying their soldiers ever increasing wages.
Finally, I want to address the broader subject of agency regarding Rome’s place within
this thesis. Through this work, I have sought to reclaim agency for the Parthian Empire, taking
control of their affairs away from Rome and returning it to Parthian hands. However, in doing
this, I have necessarily deprived the Roman Empire of some of their own agency. In particular, I
have entirely ignored the argument that exists that because of the instability of the Roman
Empire during the final period of Parthian history, the upset victory of Parthian in 216-7 CE can
be written off not as a resurgent Parthian Empire, but as a failing Roman one. Further, when I
discussed the rise of the Sassanians, this complexity was similarly ignored. Towards this
criticism, I can only respond that such focus is inevitable.
As happenings in Parthia are largely ignored when discussing the fate of the Roman
Principate and later Empire, so too are the complexities of Rome less of a focus in a study
focused on the Parthians. The editor’s preface to the 2012 Imperial Rome AD 193 to 284 by
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Clifford Ando claims that “Rome, the city and its empire, stands at the center of the history of
Europe, of the Mediterranean, and of lands which we now call the Middle East.”157 For a period
so defined by the power struggles between Parthians and Persians, to claim Rome as the
centerpiece illustrates the power of focus within an academic work.
The book itself is heavily focused on the political struggle of the Roman Empire, which is
completely understandable in such a work, but justifies this focus by stating that “those who
deny the existence or importance of the crisis discount imperial politics in favor of social and
economic life,” as if this wasn’t also a valuable line of inquiry.158 Even within the economic
discussion that is allowed by Ando, no time is spent on the trade with Parthia and later Sassanian
Persia. Again, this focus is entirely reasonable for Ando’s book. I bring it up only to provide a
comparison to the work I have done. My focus was on the Arsacid Parthian Empire, including
their rise to power and later decline and fall, with a special focus on how control of the longdistance trade routes affected their history. By its very nature, this sort of argument will discount
or diminish some facets of Roman history to keep the focus squarely on the Parthians and
Persians.
This question of the third century Roman crisis is further complicated in how it is
presented. Did the crisis begin, as Ando claims, with the death of Commodus in 192 CE and the
end of the ‘genuine’ Aurelii family, or did it begin with the death of Alexander Severus in 235
CE as the last emperor to rule more than a decade over a unified empire until Diocletian came to
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power in 284 CE?159 Nine emperors between the death of Commodus and the death of Alexander
Severus, a period of more than forty years, is not ideal, but it is nothing compared to the twenty
emperors that ruled or claimed to rule the Roman Empire in the shorter definition of the crisis.160
Add all the additional usurpers to Roman authority to the count and the forty years after the
death of Alexander Severus had more than three times the claimants to the Emperor’s throne
than the forty years leading up to his death.161
This discussion of the third century crisis is intended only to show that even if one
considers the internal problems of the Roman Empire regarding the final period of the Parthians,
there is still little to argue against the thesis I have put forwards. The crisis, whether it began in
192 CE or 235 CE, can easily be argued as stemming from a major reduction in trade revenues
from both the collapse of the Spice Route, and the resurgence in importance of the Silk and
Steppe Roads. In this way, I believe that even a study which delves into the Roman side of these
trade operations, focusing its efforts on providing as much agency to Rome as possible, would
make the same broad conclusions that I have within this work.
While the Roman Empire was certainly not beholden to the operations of the Silk Road
and Spice Route to the degree that the Parthian Empire was, they were not independent from its
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effects. Diseases like the Antonine Plague, born in the east and traveling along these routes,
ravaged the Roman Empire and upset the trade in luxury goods, upsetting the upper classes of
Roman society. This is to say, in conclusion, that I have not deprived the Romans of agency;
instead I have merely integrated Rome’s history with that of the emerging long-distance trade
routes moving across Asia and the Empires which derived their success from the exploitation of
such routes.
The end goal of this thesis is not to uncover absolute Truth regarding the Parthian
Empire. The evidence that is currently available is simply too sparse to allow for such a goal. My
goal, within this work, was two-fold. First, I wanted to disavow the orientalist narratives of 1873
and 1938 that have, through the simple fact of being the only large-scale anglophone works, been
canonized as historical fact within the field of Parthian history. Concurrent with this goal, I have
worked to propose a new theory on the rise and fall of the Parthian Empire, tied in more with the
economic realities of the ancient world, accomplished through a deep exploration of the
correlation between Parthian control over the long-distance trade routes and their imperial
success, and less with moral judgements on peoples considered ethnically ‘other’. This thesis has
not been a work of economic history per se, but a work of political history that is heavily
influenced by the ideas of economic history. Second, I hope to spark further discussion and
research into the Parthian Empire, not simply as a neighbor to more popular Roman studies, but
as a research topic within its own right. This work is fundamentally a new overview of the
Parthian Empire, seen from an economic lens, and it naturally has little engagement with much
of the religious and cultural evidence that does exist and could be further explored within the
framework I have provided.
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Future Studies
Where does the historiography of Parthia go from here? From the general histories,
tinged with the orientalism of the 19th and 20th centuries, the historiography of Parthia has been
advanced into the 21st century and largely stripped of its previous moralizing tone. Comparative
histories of Parthian art and religion exist in the forms of individual articles, but even these are
scarce in the anglophone tradition. An obvious path is to expand the evidence utilized in Iranian
scholarship, however this requires a knowledge of Arabic and Farsi that I cannot provide.
I see three clear paths forward for further inquiry into the Parthian Empire within the
anglophone body of evidence: first through a deeper dive into the microeconomic evidence that
exists for the Silk Road trade, second through a broader history of Iran, and third through a
deeper study into the nomadic heritage of the Parthians. The first path would involve a deep
study of the papyri and ostraca of Palmyra, Dura-Europos, and Roman Syria to attempt to piece
together specifics about the Silk Road trade from its conception to the fall of the Parthian
Empire. Towards the second path, one could place Parthia firmly back into the overarching
history of Iran and examine the ways that the empires of Achaemenid and Sassanian Persia are
comparatively discussed within the historiography. This sort of analysis would continue the work
of de-orientalizing these empires while repairing and rehabilitating them in the broader world
history.
It is the third path that is more interesting to me. This thesis has largely ignored the
nomadic origins of the Parthian Empire and has indeed cast the various nomadic cultures that are
discussed in the role of ‘barbarians at the gate’, harassing and harrying the Parthians during their
reign. In a significant way, this is like how histories of Rome portray the Parthian Empire:
barbarians at the gate that are only important when they factor into the political narrative of the
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subject empire’s history. However, unlike Rome’s connection to Parthia as simple imperial
neighbors, the Arsacid kings and the nobility that ruled the Parthian Empire were nomadic in
many important ways.
The easiest comparison to be made is found within the Parthian method of waging war
from horseback. The military of the Achaemenid Persians utilized cavalry in war, but it was in
the pattern of settled peoples with the nobility forming the backbone of a mounted contingent
alongside the primary force of infantry. This Achaemenid cavalry acted much like early Roman
cavalry, being possibly decisive, but usually of less importance that foot soldiers in the grand
melee. The Parthians, on the other hand, may have taken over much of Persia’s former territory,
but their method of waging war was very different in the quantity and quality of the mounted
contingent within the broader army. Along with the improved armor and weaponry of the
Parthian cavalry, it was not only the Parthian nobility that fought from horseback, but the
majority of the core Parthian force.162 With cavalry composed of deadly archers and heavily
armored knights, their tactics aped much more the ebb and flow of steppe combat than the single
pitched battles of settled peoples across the Mediterranean.163
The Parthian capitol of Ctesiphon in Mesopotamia also acted more like a nomadic camp
than settled city, serving as the base for the Parthian kings when they resided in Mesopotamia,
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but with urban activities occurring more often in the nearby city of Seleucid-on-the-Tigris. This
camp, though it acquired the sort of wealth that made it a worthy target for Roman raids, was
only one base of many that the Arsacid kings could move between.
More than anything else however, it is the Parthian method of succession that speaks to
their nomadic heritage more than anything else. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the Parthian
nobility was responsible for confirming the new king, as well as acting to depose kings who were
unqualified in their eyes. Additionally, new kings did not necessarily have to be the oldest son of
the last monarch, with the nobility having the option to choose which member of the Arsacid
dynasty was best suited for kingship; a power they regularly used especially as Parthian fortunes
turned after losing control over the Silk Road and its profits. This method of inheritance blends
the styles of both settled and nomadic cultures, creating a new hybrid method that survives into
the reign of the Sassanians after the collapse of the Parthian Empire.
In an important sense, the Parthian Empire also serves as the first documented case of a
nomadic people taking over a settled empire and ruling it for more than a few token years. The
Parthians governed an empire for hundreds of years, without ever truly assimilating with their
conquered peoples; feats that later nomadic figures like the Turks replicated. Steppe life and
culture from the Xiongnu of Han China to the Mongol khans of the 13th century changed little,
even as their settled neighbors to the south did, and a comparative study between the efforts of
the Arsacid Parthians and Turks of Central Asia could provide interesting and valuable forms of
analysis.
The nomadic heritage and nature of the Parthian Arsacids is an important facet of their
identity, even if it is one that I chose to forego for this thesis. With my focus on the rehabilitation
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of the Parthian Empire within the historical tradition, this thesis concerned itself primarily with
the Parthians as they exist within that existing historical tradition. A greater exploration into the
nomadic side of the Parthian Empire could provide avenues of inquiry and insight that do not
require new textual or archaeological material to work with, which remain difficult to come by
with Parthia as a focus.
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